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INTERACT - Researching Third Country Nationals’ Integration as a Three-way Process - 
Immigrants, Countries of Emigration and Countries of Immigration as Actors of Integration 
In 2013 (Jan. 1
st
), around 34 million persons born in a third country (TCNs) were currently living in 
the European Union (EU), representing 7% of its total population. Integrating immigrants, i.e. 
allowing them to participate in the host society at the same level as natives, is an active, not a passive, 
process that involves two parties, the host society and the immigrants, working together to build a 
cohesive society. 
Policy-making on integration is commonly regarded as primarily a matter of concern for the receiving 
state, with general disregard for the role of the sending state. However, migrants belong to two places: 
first, where they come and second, where they now live. While integration takes place in the latter, 
migrants maintain a variety of links with the former. New means of communication facilitating contact 
between migrants and their homes, globalisation bringing greater cultural diversity to host countries, 
and nation-building in source countries seeing expatriate nationals as a strategic resource have all 
transformed the way migrants interact with their home country. 
INTERACT project looks at the ways governments and non-governmental institutions in origin 
countries, including the media, make transnational bonds a reality, and have developed tools that 
operate economically (to boost financial transfers and investments); culturally (to maintain or revive 
cultural heritage); politically (to expand the constituency); legally (to support their rights). 
INTERACT project explores several important questions: To what extent do policies pursued by EU 
member states to integrate immigrants, and policies pursued by governments and non-state actors in 
origin countries regarding expatriates, complement or contradict each other? What effective 
contribution do they make to the successful integration of migrants and what obstacles do they put in 
their way? 
A considerable amount of high-quality research on the integration of migrants has been produced in 
the EU. Building on existing research to investigate the impact of origin countries on the integration of 
migrants in the host country remains to be done. 
 
INTERACT is co-financed by the European Union and is implemented by a consortium built by 
CEDEM, UPF and MPI Europe. 
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Abstract 
This report compares two important corridor migrations to Belgium in order to better understand the 
variation in several dimensions of Turkish and Moroccan immigrants’ integration – in particular, 
labour market, education and citizenship. It is based on an original methodology combining three 
different data sources (an analysis of the legal and political frameworks, a quantitative analysis, and a 
survey). It aims to test the INTERACT project’s main hypothesis which conceives of integration as a 
three-way process. This report provides insight on integration from the immigration country 
perspective but also from the countries of origin; it appraises the impact that Turkey and Morocco may 
have on the integration of their migrants in Belgium. The main findings are the following. Firstly, the 
countries of origin may have an impact on integration when emigration starts. Secondly, countries of 
origin may have a positive or negative impact on some integration dimensions (citizenship) but no 
obvious impact on others (education and labour market). In their efforts to maintain and develop links 
and to protect migrants’ rights abroad, countries of origin can thus facilitate integration, but indirectly. 
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1.1 Migration and integration trends in Belgium 
Belgium has been an immigration country since the 1920s onwards. At present, the country has a total 
population of 11,099,554, approximately 10.76% of which are migrants.
1
 The larger numbers of 
migrants (more than half) are from European member states, especially Italy, France and the 
Netherlands. The largest migrants groups in the non-EU foreign population, however, are the 
Moroccans (83,271) and Turks (37,989).
2
 Since the beginning of the 2000s, the influx of Moroccan 
and Turkish migrants has been proportionally smaller than the percentages of these nationalities in the 
existing population (Martiniello at al. 2010). Moroccans and Turks are diversely settled in the three 
federated regions of Belgium. The latter are more numerous in Flanders, whereas the Moroccans live 
mainly in the Brussels-Capital Region even though their numbers have decreased overall since 2002 
(Martiniello and Rea 2002; Martiniello et al. 2010).  
Belgium had internal labour migration before World War II, in particular from Flanders to 
Wallonia. Immigrants also came from neighbouring countries to work in Belgium. At that time, 
immigration was hardly regulated and immigrants arrived somewhat spontaneously. In 1946, Belgium 
started an active immigration policy by signing a bilateral agreement with Italy in order to recruit 
temporary migrant workers for its coal mines. After a serious accident which caused the death of many 
miners, mostly Italians, the Italian government decided to stop emigration to Belgium and put an end 
to the agreement. In order to respond to employer demand, the Belgian government signed new 
agreements with other countries from Southern Europe. In contrast with other European countries such 
as the United Kingdom, Belgium never opted to recruit migrant workers in its former colonies in 
Africa (Lesthaeghe 2000: 4). In the 1960s, other agreements were signed beyond Europe, in particular 
with Morocco and Turkey. The mid-1970s oil crisis led Belgium and other European countries to stop 
active recruitment of low-skilled workers. However, immigration continued through the right of 
family reunification which was granted to the migrant workers who opted to settle in Belgium. Turks 
and Moroccans are the first major Muslim groups to immigrate to Belgium. In 1974, Belgium became 
the first European country to officially recognize Islam (Khoojinian 2004: 114). This recognition is 
important because it permits financing for Islamic worship and the organization of Islamic courses in 
public schools. 
Given the permanent character of this immigration, which had been originally been thought to be 
temporary, the Belgian government began to develop a policy in the 1980s that was oriented towards 
these immigrants in order to encourage their integration into society (Wets 2006: 93). It set up the 
Aliens Law of 15 December 1980 (a law regulating the access to the territory, the sojourn, the 
settlement and the removal of foreigners). Belgium was also among the first signatories of the 
Schengen Convention in 1985 and modified its immigration law accordingly. Since the mid-1980s, 
Belgium experienced a new phase of growing migration, a trend common to other European countries 
(Martiniello et al. 2010). Moreover, another category of migrants came into the foreground at the end 
of the 1980s and gained importance throughout the 1990s, namely asylum seekers (Bousetta, Gsir, and 
                                                     
1
 Population on 1 January 2013 – 1,195,122 foreigners – source: National Register and General Direction of 
National Statistics (Vause 2014: 94). In this report, we mainly use the term “migrant”, in keeping with the 
INTERACT project’s focus on first generation migrants. However, Belgian statistics all refer to foreign 
nationality rather than migration. For instance, the percentage 10.76 refers to foreign nationals generally; 
many are first generation migrants, but some can also be second generation. Moreover, this figure does not 
include immigrants who became Belgian by naturalisation.  
2
 As mentioned in the previous note, these figures refer to Moroccan and Turkish nationals on 1 January 2013 
(National Register and General direction of National Statistics).  
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Jacobs 2007: 34). Coming mainly from Eastern Europe but also from Africa and Asia, asylum seekers 
and refugees contributed to the diversification of the Belgian migration landscape. From the mid-
1990s until the mid-2000s, immigration trends show the arrival of some important new streams from 
countries such as Poland, Romania, China and India (Martiniello et al. 2010). Family reunification and 
asylum have been the main motives of immigration to Belgium in the last decades. Others have 
consistently been student migration and work migration (legal migration for skilled and particularly 
for highly skilled workers and irregular migration for low-skilled migrant workers). 
Since the beginning of the 2000s, Belgium has also constantly readjusted its immigration and 
asylum policy according to European laws on immigration and asylum. The 6
th
 institutional reform of 
the Belgian state provides for the transfer of migration competencies such as labour migration from 
the federal level to the communities and regions, which are able to develop their specific policies. The 
regions set their own migration criteria for access to their specific labour markets, while the issuance 
of residence permits remains a federal responsibility. Finally, migration, integration and asylum issues 
have remained high in the political agenda during all these years. 
In the last decade, Belgian migration law has been modified with regard to specific objectives such 
as combating the fraudulent misuse of the right to family reunion and procedures for international 
protection and humanitarian regularizations; combating forced marriage; and accelerating the asylum 
procedure and promoting the voluntary return of migrants (EMN 2014). Accordingly, various 
measures have been implemented. The most important for Moroccan and Turkish migration are those 
related to family migration, such as the new Law on family reunification from 8 July 2011, which 
entered into force on 22 September 2011. This law introduced an income requirement for the sponsor 
in Belgium who wants to be joined by his/her family. In order to fight misuse of family reunification, 
which could abuse the legal and social protection system, in 2013 the Belgian government also 
adopted measures targeting marriages and legal cohabitations of convenience (ibidem). These strong 
measures have been accompanied by an information and awareness campaign against forced marriage. 
The migrant groups who were particularly targeted have been Moroccans and Turks, as well as 
Algerians and Tunisians. Moroccan and Turkish migrants are also concerned about the law of 4 
December 2012 which modifies the Belgian nationality code, and which entered into force on 1 
January 2013. Indeed, this law provides stricter conditions for access to nationality. Among other 
things, foreigners must know a national language and must be integrated.  
In Belgium, integration policies are the purview of the federated entities. Flanders (both the merged 
region and community governments), the Walloon region and the Brussels-Capital Region have each 
developed their own integration policy according to their debates and objectives regarding the 
management of cultural diversity. Moroccan and Turkish migrants were the first migrants targeted by 
these policies. For several years, Flanders has had a compulsory integration programme targeting 
newcomers. More recently, two other regions have also developed integration programmes for new 
migrants but without obligations. New Moroccan and Turkish migrants are thus differently affected by 
integration programmes, depending on the region in which they settle.  
1.2 Methodology and report structure 
The objective of this report is to compare important corridor migrations to Belgium in order to better 
understand the variation regarding several dimensions of immigrant integration. A corridor means a 
pair of countries: one origin and one destination. Here, the two countries of origin are Morocco and 
Turkey. The proposed approach allowed us to compare both corridors to a common destination, 
Belgium, and to analyse the impact of Turkey and Morocco on the integration of their migrants in 
Belgium. This report provides insight on integration from the immigration-country perspective but 
also from the countries of origin. The main hypothesis of INTERACT is to conceive of integration as a 
three-way process and to see how countries of origin may influence the integration of emigrants in the 
country of destination. This report thus tries to understand the impact of emigration and particularly 
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the diaspora policies of Morocco and Turkey on the integration of Moroccan and Turkish migrants in 
Belgium.  
The report is based on three different data sources (data triangulation): an analysis of the legal and 
political frameworks; a quantitative analysis; and a survey. The analysis of the legal and analytical 
frameworks was divided by country of origin and destination. In the countries of destination (EU28), 
the integration policy framework has been analysed; in the countries of origin (55 non-EU countries), 
emigration and diaspora policy frameworks have been scrutinized. The main questions asked 
concerned main stakeholders, policy actors, policy discourses and legal frameworks. For the 
quantitative analysis, a synthetic index of integration was built. It allows a comparison of the level of 
integration of migrants in EU Member States by dimension and by migration corridor. To this end, a 
set of integration indicators were identified for each dimension, drawing on relevant national datasets. 
Using the Principal Component Analysis technique, the number of these indicators was reduced and 
replaced with a smaller number of new variables. These new variables (principal components) explain 
the maximum amount of variation among the performances of different immigration corridors, 
considering the three domains separately. On this basis, a synthetic index that allows the ranking of the 
immigrant corridors within each dimension was created. The main indicators used to build up the main 
three indexes were: 
Labour market integration index  
• Employment rate 
• Unemployment rate 
• Activity rate 
• Over-qualification rate 
Education integration index  
• Highest educational attainment 
• School enrolment rate at ages 15-25  
• School enrolment rate at ages 25-35 
• Percentage of international students at ages 20-24 
Citizenship integration index  
• Citizenship acquisition rate 
• Percentage of naturalised citizens of the total born-abroad population (2013 data) 
The indexes rank the corridors based on the level of integration by assigning numbers from 0 to 1. The 
higher the rank, the better the integration. In the corridor reports, the index is calculated without taking 
into account the gap between migrants and natives. It should be interpreted whereby the higher the 
index, the better the performance of that corridor compared to the other corridors (Di Bartolomeo, 
Kalantaryan, and Bonfanti 2015).  
The INTERACT survey was an exploratory survey conducted between December 2013 and 
September 2014. The survey targeted civil society organisations working in eighty-two countries 
(twenty-eight EU countries of destination and fifty-four countries of origin with more than 100,000 
migrants residing in the EU). Any organisation dealing with migrant integration in one of the eight 
dimensions (labour market, education, language, social interactions, religion, political and civic 
participation, nationality issues, housing) could take part in the survey. Respondents could choose 
between one and three integration dimensions in which their organisation was active. The survey was 
translated into twenty-eight languages and over 900 responses were collected online and over the 
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phone. Although the exploratory character of the survey does not allow one to make generalisations 
about the whole population of civil society organisations, it sheds light onto how these actors’ 
activities impact migrant integration between the origin and destination. However, the survey does 
much more than just maps these activities in the comparative context. It also shows how organisations 
perceive states of origin and their policies in the context of the day-to-day reality of incorporating 
migrants into the receiving society. In this report, only information pertaining to Moroccan and 
Turkish migrants in Belgium is presented.
3
 
The first part of the report provides an overview of Moroccan and Turkish migration into Belgium 
since the signature, fifty years ago, of the bilateral agreements first between Belgium and the Kingdom 
of Morocco and second, between Belgium and the Republic of Turkey. Temporary labour migration 
and first family-migration characterized the period of 1960-1974. The following period from 1975 
onwards is characterized by family migrations and other migrations. In the second part of the report, 
the legal and political frameworks of both countries of origin and the country of destination are 
scrutinized. Belgian integration policies are described according to the level of authority on which 
they depend (federal state, region or community). Then emigration and diaspora policies implemented 
by Morocco and Turkey are examined. The third part explores the integration trends of Turkish and 
Moroccan migrants in Belgium along several dimensions of integration: labour market, education, 
citizenship and civic and political participation, and housing. This part is based on the INTERACT 
quantitative analysis (Di Bartolomeo et al. 2015) and also on the available literature. The next part 
aims to explain the factors of the integration trends. In the final section, some conclusions are sketched 
regarding the impact of Morocco and Turkey on the integration of their emigrants in Belgium.  
2. Immigration trends of Moroccans and Turkish people into Belgium  
2.1 Temporary labour migration and first family-migration (1960-1974) 
The organized migration of Moroccans and Turks to Belgium dates back fifty years to the signature of 
bilateral agreements between Belgium and Morocco on 17 February 1964 and then with Turkey on 17 
July 1964 (Moniteur belge 1977a; 1977b). Since the end of World War II, Belgium had a critical need 
for manpower to rebuild the country and in particular, to work in the coal mines. After the recruitment 
of Italian workers in the immediate post-war period, followed by Spaniards and Greeks, Belgian 
authorities continued to look after new migrant workers. In the beginning of the 1960s, Belgium was 
in an economic boom and a tight labour market. The Belgian authorities became lax about the 
implementation of the 1936 law (Martens 2004: 252).
4
 This law required employers to get an 
employment authorization based on national worker-shortages, and required foreign nationals to 
obtain a labour permit prior to working and on the basis of which a sojourn permit might be granted 
(ibidem). At that time, Belgian authorities tolerated a form of irregular immigration by Moroccans and 
then later Turks, who spontaneously came to work without prior authorization. The employers, in 
particular the coal federation Fédéchar, pressured the government for a sufficient labour force to 
insure coal production. At the same time, estimates of the population decline in the Wallonia region, 
according to the Sauvy and Delpérée Reports published in 1962, encouraged the Belgian authorities to 
try to organize a massive recruitment of workers beyond Southern Europe. The two new bilateral 
agreements helped to frame the immigration of workers and their families from Morocco and Turkey. 
However, it would be wrong to think that Moroccan and Turkish immigration started exactly after 
the signing of these agreements. Actually, they had already begun in the early 1960s, due to the high 
demand for labour in European industries – and in particularly in Belgium, in the coal mines – but also 
                                                     
3
 For more information, please refer to the forthcoming INTERACT survey report. 
4
 The Royal Decree n°285 of 31 March 1936. 
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due to socio-economic and political developments in Morocco and Turkey. The fact that the 
authorities of the countries of origin supported emigration cannot be neglected (Lievens 1999). 
Moroccan authorities had contacted the Belgian government to propose Moroccan workers for Belgian 
coal mines as early as 1957 (Frennet-De Keyser 2004b: 216). Turkey, with its surplus of labour linked 
to the mechanization of agricultural work, had already signed a bilateral agreement with Germany in 
1961 to allow migration (Bayar, Ertorun, and Kisacik 2004). In 1963, the Turkish government 
established a five-year plan to facilitate emigration to other countries (ibidem). Morocco also sought to 
facilitate emigration from some underdeveloped rural areas such as the Rif, where the lack of 
resources had led the population to revolt (Aziza 2004). In that case, encouraging emigration was due 
to both economic and political reasons as the population of these areas were mainly Berbers, who had 
a difficult relationship with the dominant Arab-speaking population (Lesthaeghe 2000:19). 
The Moroccan presence in Belgium pre-dated Turkish immigration. Aside from the turn of the 
century when Moroccans were asked to take part in World War I, there had also been a circulation of 
Moroccan workers between the French coal mines and the Belgian coal mines of Borinage and the 
Liège region (Bare 2004) since 1920. During World War II, Moroccan soldiers took part in battles in 
Belgium such as the Battle of Gembloux (Atouf 2004). In 1960, there were 461 Moroccans in Belgium 
(Schoonvaere 2013). Immigration increased due to favourable economic conditions. In the 1960s, in 
addition to workers, some Moroccan opponents to the Moroccan regime found asylum in Belgium. 
Thus in the early 1960s, a spontaneous and individual Moroccan labour immigration had already 
begun, given the laissez-faire policies of the Belgian authorities. The bilateral convention established 
with Morocco is based on the model of previous bilateral agreements that Belgium signed with Italy, 
Spain and Greece. In the agreement with Morocco, however, the costs of transportation of migrant 
workers is born by the employers instead of the Belgian state. The primary aim of the bilateral 
convention was to supervise and accelerate immigration. However, according to some, the majority of 
Moroccans kept coming to Belgium spontaneously rather than through the organized recruitment 
channels (Frennet-De Keyser 2004b). 
Turkish immigration began in Europe in the early 1960s, and in Belgium, in 1963 with the 
development of a spontaneous immigration of individual workers from certain Turkish cities (Bayar 
1992; Schoonvaere 2013). Turkish emigration is related to the modernization of agriculture that 
pushed many rural people onto the roads of internal migration. Once in the Turkish cities, some of 
these migrants then travelled to Western Europe and particularly to Germany which had set up a 
system of guest workers with Turkey beginning in 1961 (Wets 2006: 85). Since the 1960s, the Turkish 
government organized emigration and established an Office of Labour and Recruitment of Workers 
(ibidem). In addition to this official channel of emigration, some Turks migrated with the support of 
relatives or co-villagers who preceded them. In July 1964, a bilateral agreement was signed between 
Turkey and Belgium in order to organize the recruitment of Turkish migrant workers. This agreement 
seems to be similar to the Moroccan agreement, however it is different. The agreement organized 
Turkish immigration to the Belgian mining industry with quotas (Khoojinian 2007: 19). The 
agreement was negotiated by both Belgian and Turkish authorities and it is more complex than the 
Moroccan one because it has a protocol relating to various social aspects of the life of Turkish 
immigrants.
5
 For instance, this protocol included some provisions regarding access to social housing 
(art. 7). In addition, the agreement signed with Turkey allowed the grouping of dependent parents if 
the Turkish migrant could prove particular circumstances and support for the parents (Nys 2002: 335). 
The immigration policy implemented in Belgium via the 1964 bilateral agreements to attract 
migrant workers as well as the continued tolerance of irregular immigration was influenced by factors 
internal to Belgium (by a population decline and labour demand in certain economic sectors) as well 
as by external factors such as competition with neighbouring countries for a foreign labour force. The 
                                                     
5
 This was not the case for the agreement with Morocco, which would be completed by a technical cooperation 
agreement in 1965 and a social security agreement in 1968. 
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bilateral agreements particularly aimed to attract Moroccan and Turkish workers to Belgium. That is 
why unlike the bilateral agreements of this type established by neighbouring countries such as France 
or Germany, they included specific provisions to attract and stabilize Moroccan and Turkish workers 
in Belgium. These attractive conditions consisted of opportunities for family reunification after three 
months of work for Moroccans and after just one month for Turks, and the provision of adequate 
housing (Gsir and Meireman 2005: 5). Family life was presented as suitable for the well-being of 
workers; it was considered a means to keep the workers in Belgium as well as a way of resolving the 
demographic decline. Since 1964, Belgian authorities, in collaboration with employers, have invited 
Moroccan and Turkish workers to come and live in Belgium with their families. An additional 
measure was implemented to facilitate family reunification. In 1965, a Royal Decree allowed the 
reimbursement of half of the travel expenses of a Moroccan wife who joined her husband with their 
minor children, provided that the latter were at least three years old (Frennet-De Keyser 2004a). From 
1964, 10% of Turkish migrants were women. This proportion grew yearly to reach 35% in 1966 
(Schoonvaere 2013: 34). Finally, with these two bilateral agreements, the Belgian authorities aimed 
not only to attract a labour force (Turkish and Moroccan migrant workers) but also to ensure the 
reproduction of the labour force (Turkish and Moroccan migrant women) (Ouali 2004a: 27). 
These bilateral agreements framed an important part of Moroccan and Turkish immigrants in the 
1960s. However, individual Moroccan and Turkish migrants continued to arrive in Belgium as before 
the agreements. Coming as “tourists” when there were shortages, they were welcomed to work 
because they were cheaper and could obtain work permits afterwards. These migrants came directly 
from Morocco and Turkey, but not exclusively; some of them came from France or other neighbouring 
countries. In addition, Moroccan workers in Belgium were also poached by German and Dutch firms 
(Frennet-De Keyser 2004b: 237). 
Moroccan and Turkish migrant workers were first employed in the coal mines, but not exclusively. 
Both bilateral agreements pertained to extractive industries as well as to other employment sectors: 
metallurgy, foundry and construction. The work in these sectors was characterized as hard, dangerous 
and painful. Beside the mining industries, the main sectors of employment were the metal industry and 
construction but also increasingly tertiary sectors such as transport and services (Lesthaeghe 2000: 4). 
Both Moroccan and Turkish migrant workers could obtain a work permit unrestricted to particular 
sectors after three consecutive working years, provided they were with their family (otherwise it was 
after five years). 
As soon as these bilateral conventions were signed, the needs for workers in the coal mines 
progressively diminished. In the following years, deteriorating economic conditions and increased 
unemployment led to a progressive policy of changes: first, less flexibility regarding spontaneous 
migration and second, no new working permits issued in a time of high unemployment and a 
reinforced law on migrant workers (Schoonvaere 2013: 34). These restrictive measures drastically 
reduced Moroccan and Turkish labour immigration in 1965 and 1966 (ibidem). Nevertheless, 
clandestine immigration kept going on. From 1969 to 1974, one can again observe spontaneous 
Turkish immigration for jobs in the wood industry in South Belgium and in construction (Bayar et al. 
2004). Due to the economic recession, in August 1974 the Belgian government decided to stop all 
active recruitment of migrant workers. Simultaneously, an amnesty to regularize irregular migrant 
workers was organized the same year. Around 8,420 applications, mostly from Moroccan and Turkish 
migrants, were submitted and 7,448 were accepted (EMN 2005: 106).  
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2.2 Family migration and other migrations (1975-2014) 







































































































Moroccan and Turkish immigration to Belgium
Morocco
Turkey
  Sources: Vause 2014; Perrin and Schoonvaere 2011; SOPEMI 1999. 
After the official closure of labour migration, Turkish and Moroccan immigrant workers settled in 
Belgium, joined by their spouses and minor children or sometimes by their dependent parents, in the 
case of Turks. This period of family reunification for the first generation of Turkish and Moroccan 
migrant workers lasted until the mid-1980s. Afterwards, a period of family formation or marriage 
migration began. Turkish and Moroccan immigrants married a spouse in Turkey or Morocco, who 
then also immigrated to Belgium. The number of Moroccan and Turkish women increased during this 
period of major family reunification. 
During the last three decades, Turkish immigration tended to grow yearly even though this was not 
the case in several particular years (1988, 1994, 1997) (Schoonvaere 2013: 37). Moreover, Moroccans 
and Turks are the two nationalities in Belgium receiving the highest numbers of sojourn permits for 
family reunification reasons (Lodewycks et al. 2011: 23). The next figure provides an overview of 
Moroccan and Turkish entries for family reasons from 2008 to 2013. In comparison with other 
foreigners in Belgium, Turks and Moroccans mainly enter Belgium for family reasons; in 2011, they 
received 65% and 71% of these kinds of sojourn permits, respectively (Vause 2014: 62). In 2008, 
Moroccan and Turkish migrants represented 40% of the total number of migrants admitted in Belgium 
for family reasons. Nevertheless, they progressively diminished and in 2013 represented only 23% of 
the migrants admitted for family reasons. 
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  Source: Eurostat 2014. 
Since the end of the 2000s, a new type of family migration has been the arrival of old Turkish people 
who have joined their children living in Belgium (Manço 2012: 3). The bilateral agreement signed 
with Turkey in 1964 provided an article allowing family reunification for dependent parents. 
While most immigrants during this long period came from Turkey and Morocco through family 
reunification, others also came as workers, students, asylum seekers, irregular migrants or as persons 
who overstayed their visa and became clandestine. The tables below give an overview of the different 
categories of inflows in the last years. The numbers of both Turkish and Moroccan highly skilled 
workers has risen. From 2010, some Moroccan and Turkish researchers were also admitted but in the 
table 1 they are included in the numbers of highly skilled workers. Residence permits are granted for 
other remunerated activities. Finally, Moroccan and Turkish workers who received a first sojourn-
permit for work represent, on average, 7% of the migrants admitted in Belgium for work.  
Table 1. Sojourn permit for work  
  Morocco Turkey Total  
(M & T) 
Total  
(all foreigners)  
 HQ/R O Tot. HQ/R O Tot.   
2008 81 66 147  186 150 336 483 7,097 
2009 23 285 308  19 189 208 516 5,391 
2010 4 196 200  13 220 233 433 4,347 
2011 5 217 222 16 231 247 469 4,705 
2012 2 173 175 13 218 231 406 4,647 
2013 5 128 133 5 173 178 311 4,347 
Note. HQ/R = highly qualified workers and researchers; O = other remunerated activities. 
Source: Eurostat 2014. 
The number of Moroccan and Turkish students is more fluctuant during this period and in particular 
declines for Moroccans. Moroccan and Turkish students represented around 15% of the total number 
Corridor Report on Belgium – The case of Moroccan and Turkish Immigrants 
INTERACT RR2015/03 15 
of foreigners admitted for education purposes in 2008. However, this figure has declined to less than 
10% in the last couple of years.  
Table 2. Sojourn permit for studies 
 Morocco Turkey Total (M & T) Total (all foreigners) 
2008 623 393  1,016 6,743 
2009 581 427  1,008 7,222 
2010 469 331  800 5,899 
2011 367 328 695 5,834 
2012 268 294 562 5,813 
2013 253 308 561 5,902 
Source: Eurostat 2014. 
In contrast with other motives for migration, asylum claims from Turkish people are twelve times 
more likely than from Moroccans, as shown by the following graph. The main reason is that they 
include Kurdish people from Turkey, who are fleeing political persecution in Turkey or conflicts 
between the Turks and Kurds.  
Figure 3. Asylum claims of Moroccans and Turks in Belgium between 1988-2013 
 
Source: EMN 2012 (Immigration Office); Eurostat 2008-2013. 
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The Table 3 below presents the number of sojourn permits granted to Moroccans and Turks from 2008 
to 2013, mainly for humanitarian reasons: refugee status, international protection, subsidiary 
protection and also for unspecified reasons. 
Table 3. Sojourn permit for other reasons 
 Morocco Turkey Total  
(M & T) 
Total (all 
foreigners) 
 SIP Res. unsp. SIP Res. unsp.   
2008 0 0 338 74 0 298  710 12,041 
2009 418 14 0 484 5 0  921 17,803 
2010 1,280 0 571 439 0 204  2,494 17,063 
2011 1,494 0 893 293 0 220 2,900 14,472 
2012 1,012 0 869 132 0 199 2,212 11,758 
2013 334 … 894 92 0 208 1,528 9,948 
Note: SIP = Status of International Protection, refugee, subsidiary protection, other humanitarian reasons; Res. = 
residence only; unsp. = unspecified reason.  
Source: Eurostat 2014. 
Figures regarding irregular migrants are always difficult to establish. During the period 1998-2004, 
10,560 Moroccan and 5,856 Turkish migrants were intercepted because they were “illegal” 
immigrants or asylum seekers (whether or not their application was subsequently rejected) (EMN 
2005: 33). During the regularization campaign of January 2000 (the law dates from 22 December 
1999), of the 37,152 applications (concerning around 50,000 migrants), 4.7% of applications were 
from Turks and 14.5% from Moroccans (EMN 2005: 105). 
Finally, prospective trends regarding emigration from Turkey to the European Union indicate that 
at least two dynamics are at stake: one focusing on labour migration needs in relation to the European 
demographic decline, and the other, on Turkish needs to modernize its economy from the perspective 
of adhesion to European Union (Akagul 2008: 334). In the case of Morocco, the first dynamics is also 
at stake. 
3. Institutional and policy framework  
3.1 Integration policies in Belgium 
The bilateral agreements with Morocco and Turkey included some elements regarding the integration 
of Moroccan and Turkish migrant workers in Belgium. Nevertheless, the employers rather than the 
Belgian state were in charge of migrant integration during the 1960s and 1970s (Gsir and Meireman 
2005: 2). The first and most decisive element was labour market integration for Moroccans and Turks 
when they were admitted for work. The agreements included also other elements of integration. They 
provided Moroccan and Turkish workers with the same social rights and working conditions as 
Belgian workers (social security, family allowances). They allowed them to be joined by their family 
members, who were also granted the right to work under certain conditions. Regarding several aspects, 
the Turkish agreement was more complete than the Moroccan one. It included family allowances for 
children still residing in Turkey (art. 10). While in both agreements the provision of migrant housing 
relied mainly on employers, who provided community housing, Turkish workers were allowed to 
enjoy social housing benefits (art. 7) through the annexed protocol of the Turkish agreement. There 
was even a promise to grant them a room reserved for prayers in the phalansteries (art. 18 of the 
protocol). The bilateral agreement with Turkey also encouraged employers to organize language 
classes (art.7). The only element regarding socio-cultural integration for Moroccan workers was that 
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they were allowed not to work on public holidays observed in Morocco (art. 16). Nevertheless, the 
implementation of these socio-cultural integration elements was not easy. For example, language 
classes were mainly focused on teaching migrant workers technical vocabulary for coal mines 
(Khoojinian 2007: 7). In addition, the sojourn was a condition of the work permit and thus all 
stakeholders thought that immigration was for the most part temporary. Even though measures were 
taken to settle the migrants, they aimed above all to favour migrant workers stability at work place. 
The rationale of Belgian authorities and employers was first and foremost economic, supporting 
profitability rather than the integration of new populations into Belgian society.  
Before turning to the development of a genuine political integration of migrants by the Belgian 
government, three elements need to be underlined. First of all, as mentioned above, after ending active 
labour recruitment, the Belgian government organized an amnesty in 1974, which allowed the 
regularization of mainly Moroccan and Turkish clandestine migrant workers. This amnesty can 
definitely be considered a one-shot integration measure. Secondly, in the same year – and this is 
particularly important for both Turks and Moroccans immigrants, who were mainly Muslim – Islam 
was officially recognized as a Belgian religion. The following new school year, public schools had to 
offer Islamic classes, and under the supervision of Belgian and Turkish authorities, teachers were sent 
to Belgium to provide these classes (Khoojinian 2004: 114). Thirdly, the issue of political participation 
by foreigners emerged quite early in Belgium. It is important to remember that in Belgium, voting is 
compulsory. At the end of the 1960s, the first consultative bodies for immigrants were created in 
Wallonia. They were established by some of the political parties such as the socialist party, and were 
considered transitional measures to full voting participation (Lambert 1999). Between 1968 and 1975, 
around thirty consultative bodies of this type were created in Belgium (ibidem). Both Turkish and 
Moroccan migrants participated in the consultative bodies for immigrants offering to some migrants a 
significant first experience of political participation in Belgium. Indeed, once naturalized, some of the 
Moroccan migrants from the consultative bodies became involved in politics and were elected at the 
local level (ibidem). The question of granting voting rights to immigrants, at least at the local level, 
has been sharply discussed in Belgium. The Belgian local elections of 2000, in which European 
foreigners (in accordance with European law) would be allowed to participate, brought the issue of 
voting by non-EU foreigners back to the fore. This was particularly critical for Moroccan and Turkish 
migrants who, in many cases, had been residing in Belgium for longer periods than EU citizens. After 
long and heated debates, the Belgian Constitution (art. 8) was modified in 1998 in order to allow 
foreigners to vote at local elections. Nevertheless, as the new Electoral Law had not yet been 
approved, non-EU foreigners could not participate in the 2000 local elections (Lambert 1999). It was 
only in 2004 that Turkish and Moroccan migrants residing legally in Belgium for at least five years 
could participate for the first time in local elections.  
The Belgian integration policy started in the mid-1980s with the awareness of the sustainability of 
immigrants – mainly Turks and Moroccans – and the acceptance of their settlement (Rea 2003). The 
two first milestones of the integration policy created in 1984 were the new nationality code 
introducing jus soli elements (mentioned above), and the creation in 1988 of the Royal Commissariat 
for Immigrant Policy, which would be in charge of defining the Belgian integration policy. The latter 
was created in reaction to the rise of the extreme-right in Flanders (Jacobs 2004: 245). In its first 
report (1989), the Royal Commissariat defined integration as (a) assimilation where public order 
requires it, (b) respect for Belgian society’s fundamental principles, (c) respect for cultural diversity 
(CRPI 1989: 38-39). This definition influenced integration policies in Flanders and Wallonia as 
described below. The Royal Commissariat was replaced in 1993 by the Centre for Equal Opportunities 
and Opposition to Racism, an autonomous public service agency at the federal level. Its mission was 
to ensure follow-up to the Royal Commissariat’s integration policy, to fight against racism and other 
types of discrimination and to administer the Impulse Fund for Migration Policy, created in 1991. This 
fund aims to sustain social integration projects targeting people, prevent discrimination and promote 
intercultural dialogue. It should be noted that 75% of the available funds must target projects located 
in the five largest cities in the country and their agglomerations (Antwerp, Brussels, Charleroi, Gent 
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and Liège).
6
 These cities are places where many migrants live, particularly Moroccan and Turkish 
migrants in various distributions (see below). Another instrument, Urban Policy, which targets zones 
rather than immigrants and specifically aims to support integration, was set up in 1999. This federal 
policy supports urban renovation initiatives in large cities in order to improve the socio-economic 
situation. The federal policy had three main axes: facilitating access to Belgian nationality, fighting 
racism and fighting social inequalities (Rea 2003: 124 quoted by Mandin 2014: 3). 
Aside from the federal level, other levels of governance have developed their own discourses and 
policies on immigrant integration, due to several constitutional reforms in Belgium, The communities 
(Flemish, German-speaking and French-speaking) have jurisdiction over so-called “person-related 
matters” such as immigrant integration. In 1994, the French-speaking community transferred its 
competencies in immigrant integration to two territorial entities: the Brussels-Capital Region and 
Wallonia. Integration policies in Flanders and Wallonia are based on two decrees, respectively the 
Minorities Decree signed by the Flemish government in 1998 and the Decree on the integration of 
foreigners or persons of foreign origin signed in 1996 by the Walloon government. Finally, in 2012, 
the various governments (federal state, regions and communities) decided to cooperate and to 
transform the Centre for Equal Opportunities and Opposition to Racism into the Interfederal Centre for 
Equal Opportunities and the Federal Centre of Migration. The first has a scope of competencies which 
have been enlarged to include the Regions and Communities. The second is a federal centre which 
aims to provide expertise on migration and related questions. 
Flanders 
In Flanders, where community and regional institutions are merged, a policy targeting migrants 
developed progressively in the 1990s. The rationale of this policy was to recognize ethnic minorities 
and their cultural identities, and to encourage migrant associations to self-organize. The Flemish 
integration policy is also based on the assumption forged by Flemish nationalist history that original 
cultural identity is a vector of emancipation (De Smet 2012: 4). In 1995, the Flemish government 
adopted the basis of the Flemish minorities’ policy. This integration policy is threefold: firstly, the 
“emancipation policy” of legal “allochtonous populations” (migrants, refugees and nomads) calls for 
their participation in Flemish society as full citizens. Secondly, the reception policy for newcomers 
who arrive, for example, in the context of family reunification, aims to familiarize them with society 
and with the Belgian and Flemish institutions and authorities (see infra, the inburgering policy). 
Thirdly, the assistance policy aims to provide assistance to undocumented migrants in cases of 
emergency. In 1998, the Minorities Decree (minderhedendecreet) defined precisely five target groups 
of the minorities’ policy, namely: the so-called allochtonous (when at least one parent is born abroad), 
refugees, travelling groups, non-Dutch-speaking foreign newcomers and undocumented migrants 
(Jacobs 2004: 285). The Ethno-cultural Minorities Forum (Minderhedenforum) ensured 
communication between the target groups and organizations. The Minorities Decree recognized 
migrant associations and proposed concrete measures to promote their participation (Carewijn and 
Ouali 1998). At the beginning of 2002, fourteen regional associations were recognized, including three 
Turkish migrant associations and two Moroccan ones.  
The Flemish policy is inspired by the Dutch integration policy, based on the recognition of ethno-
cultural groups (Carewijn and Ouali 1998). But the Flemish system does not explicitly recognize 
particular ethnic groups, even though this is often the case in implementation. In addition to this 
multiculturalist approach, a more assimilationist approach was initiated at the end of the 1990s and 
further developed in the 2000s. With the Decree on Flemish civic integration policy, the government 
developed an inburgering policy for newcomers. Since 2004, all new immigrants arriving in Flanders 
                                                     
6
 http://www.diversitybelgium.be/impulse-fund#Doelstellingen%20van%20het%20Impulsfonds, visited on 31 
March 2014. 
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must participate in a civic integration programme (inburgeringstraject). The Flemish authorities 
designed eight welcome offices to welcome and accompany newcomers. They are located in Antwerp, 
Gent and in five Flemish provinces. One is also in Brussels (see infra). The civic integration 
programme targets adult foreigners who come to Flanders to reside for a long period. As the target 
group also includes migrants who became naturalised citizens of Belgium and migrants with at least 
one parent who was not born in Belgium, Turkish and Moroccan newcomers (but also Belgians with a 
Turkish or Moroccan background) may have to sign a civic integration contract and follow the 
integration programme. It is compulsory for the first groups and available to the latter. The Flemish 
authorities have also underlined that this programme is compulsory for newly-arrived ministers of 
religion in a local church or religious community that is recognised by the Flemish authorities. Since 
Islam is also recognized and as Turks and Moroccans are the largest Muslim communities in Belgium, 
this measure particularly applies to imams from Turkey and Morocco. The integration programme is a 
programme of individual training and coaching. Depending on the needs of the migrant, the training 
program may have up to three components: Dutch as a second language, social orientation (practical 
information about living in Belgium and Belgian institutions) and vocational guidance. The Flemish 
Centre for Minorities (Vlaams Minderheden Centrum), which since 2010 has been renamed the 
Intersection Migration-Integration (Kruispunt Migratie-Integratie), supports the reception desks. 
Reception desks also work in collaboration with other Flemish institutions such as the Flemish Office 
of Employment and Professional Training, Dutch Language Houses, etc. Failing to attend a mandatory 
civic integration programme can result in administrative fines. 
In the strategic plan of the Flemish policy on minorities “living together in diversity, in an active 
and shared citizenship (2004-2009)”, the Flemish government affirms that everyone needs to 
participate in society in accordance with each other. Furthermore, each person has to contribute to 
society through his or her own efforts and work, to respect the rights and fundamental freedoms and 
standards laid down in the Constitution as well as the laws and decrees, and to avoid exclusion or 
discrimination of others on ethnic, religious or cultural grounds. The emphasis is on social cohesion 
and the responsibility of citizens regardless of their origin. In the last plan, 2009-2014, the Ministry of 
Integration announced subsequent civic integration programmes but also the need for evaluation and 
efficient coordination with other policies such as employment. In 2013, a new integration Decree was 
approved which planned the establishment of an Integration Agency (Mandin 2014: 5). 
Influenced by the Dutch policy, Flanders developed a hybrid policy combining both elements of 
multi-culturalist and assimilationist approaches (Jacobs 2004: 288). The multi-culturalist stance is 
characterized by the minority policy which recognizes ethno-cultural minorities, the Minorities Forum 
and the recognition of cultural diversity, whereas the civic integration programmes rely on a more 
assimilationist approach aiming at cultural homogeneity. 
Wallonia 
In contrast with Flanders, the French-speaking and Walloon governments have been reluctant to 
recognize ethnic minorities (Jacobs 2004: 282). In Wallonia, there was not, strictly speaking, an 
integration policy targeting immigrants. The Walloon authorities instead developed policies targeting 
specific deprived areas. Immigrant integration is embraced in the broader policies of social action 
developed by the Walloon General Direction of Social Action and Health. These policies targeted the 
disadvantaged classes but especially served immigrants in certain neighbourhoods. Priority was given 
to the fight against social exclusion through priority education areas, priority actions areas and positive 
discrimination measures. Furthermore, in 1998, the French Community adopted the “Affirmative 
Action” Decree (Décret Discrimination positive), which called for support for schools where pupils 
had weak socio-economic backgrounds. The Decree aimed to promote equal opportunities among 
pupils. Its implementation showed that the schools receiving support were mainly schools where the 
majority of pupils had immigration backgrounds, in particular second and third generation Turkish and 
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Moroccan children. New young Moroccan and Turkish migrants also benefit from the Decree as soon 
as they go to these schools. 
A noteworthy measure aiming at immigrant integration in Wallonia was the Decree on the 
integration of foreigners or persons of foreign origin adopted in 1996 by the Walloon government. 
This Decree was the consequence of institutional change and not the result of a political or societal 
change (De Smet 2012: 4). It came from the policy transfer of the French-speaking Community to the 
Walloon Region where integration was not on the political agenda (ibidem). The target group of the 
Decree is quite wide as it includes both foreign nationals and Belgians with a foreign background. 
However, irregular migrants are out of its scope. The Walloon Decree aimed to keep public authorities 
and associations active on integration matters. It established and sponsored Regional Integration 
Centres in several Walloon cities (Charleroi, La Louvière, Mons, Namur, Liège, Verviers and Tubize). 
These centres aimed to support the integration of immigrants and people of foreign origin. Among 
other things, they organized actions to promote intercultural relations, trainings, interpreter services, 
job coaching etc. At the beginning, they worked quite autonomously without real coordination and 
without a real Walloon integration policy. For a couple of years, they have been supported by the 
DISCRI platform, which aims to ensure better communication and transversal actions. The point is 
that they are very locally anchored, working closely with local authorities and local associations. 
These centres are supported by the General Direction of Social Action and Health which also 
promoted associations and projects focused on immigrant integration. Partially contesting the Walloon 
integration policy, the regional integration centres advocated to modify the Decree in order to redefine 
the objective of the integration policy, which should, according to them, aim to support “an 
intercultural society based on diversity management” (Torrekens et al. 2014: 31). The Decree was 
modified in 2009, but without meaningful changes in terms of integration objectives. 
In Wallonia, the integration measures were mainly conceived for long-established migrants and 
their offspring (Torrekens et al. 2014: 26). They particularly concerned Moroccan and Turkish 
migrants as they have been the major groups coming from non-European countries. Since 2012, a 
project targeting newcomers has been at top of the political agenda. In March 2014, the Walloon 
Parliament adopted the Decree establishing integration programmes (parcours d’intégration) for new 
immigrants. One of the central issues dividing the debates was its compulsory character. In the end, 
only one part of the integration programme was made compulsory. Within three months of arrival in a 
Walloon town, each newcomer must attend a reception module comprised of information on the rights 
and duties of each person residing in Belgium as well as an individual interview in order to assess their 
social needs (skills, diplomas, credential recognition and needs identification). After completing this 
module, the newcomer receives a certificate; migrants who do not attend, however, face fines. Three 
other modules of the integration programme are not compulsory. They consist of French language 
courses, citizenship training and socio-occupational orientation. The Regional Integration Centres are 
in charge of implementing these new integration programmes. 
Finally, in Wallonia, the integration of immigrants has not been conceived of in a very 
interventionist way, as in Flanders, and the government has instead opted for a “laissez-faire 
assimilationist policy” (Adam 2013: 554). With regard to policy implementation, the Walloon 
government gave significant manoeuvring room to civil society (particularly to associations dealing 
with integration issues, which were not specifically immigrant associations). After the 1996 Decree, it 
also gave wide autonomy to the Regional Integration Centres. The study by Torrekens and her 
colleagues (2014) revealed that the way integration is approached varies among the several Regional 
Integration Centres – from an approach influenced by the French Republican model to an approach 
recognizing and valorising fundamental rights for all (including cultural and religious rights) 
(Torrekens et al. 2014: 32-33). Turkish and Moroccan migrants have obviously been the beneficiaries 
of the Walloon integration measures. As mentioned above, they were also the main target groups since 
they were the main long-established migrants from countries which did not join the European 
Communities, and since the Decree focused their offspring. 
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Brussels-Capital Region 
The Brussels-Capital is a bilingual region created in 1989. It is a small area (161 km
2
) which includes 
19 municipalities, one of which is Brussels (called the City of Brussels). In this region, the integration 
policy has various faces because it is supported, on the one hand by the Flemish Community 
Commission (Vlaamse Gemmeenschapcommissie), and by the French Community Commission 
(Commission Communautaire Française) on the other. The Flemish Community Commission’s 
objective was to promote integration in the Flemish community, particularly through Dutch courses. In 
Brussels, it relied on the Flemish minorities policy. But it also developed its own policy on minorities 
with three objectives: empowerment, hospitality and support for irregular migrants. To achieve its 
policy, it collaborated with the Integration Regional Centre Foyer in Brussels. Furthermore, in 2004, 
the Flemish government implemented civic integration programmes in the Brussels-Capital Region, as 
it did in Flanders. The only difference is that in Brussels, civic integration programmes are not 
compulsory. They are implemented by the Brussels Reception Agency for Integration (BON). 
Secondly, the French Community Commission developed inclusion and cohabitation policies 
including the social inclusion of residents living in deprived areas, and cohabitation and integration 
programmes to improve relations between local communities. It also supported the Brussels Centre for 
Intercultural Action. This association has four main activities: trainings on inter-culturality, 
information on immigration (in particular through the publication of a magazine (l’Agenda 
Interculturel), cultural dissemination and support for the self-organization of immigrant populations. 
Since the social cohesion Decree of 13 May 2004, in force since 2006, the Brussels Centre for 
Intercultural Action is also in charge of its implementation. An objective is welcoming newcomers, 
which includes support for actions aimed helping them to learn French as a foreign language.  
Moreover, since the 1990s, the government of the Brussels-Capital has developed neighbourhood 
revitalization and housing renovation policies. Since Turkish and Moroccan migrants in particular 
have lived in certain municipalities and neighbourhoods in the Brussels-Capital which are both highly 
ethnically segregated and deprived, they have been targeted by these policies. These various policies 
have consisted of: first, Security Contracts set up in 1992 which aim to prevent delinquency; second, 
the Neighbourhood Contracts established in 1994 for the rehabilitation and renovation of vulnerable 
neighbourhoods; and third, in 1998, Shopping Area Contracts aimed at revitalizing commercial 
districts. Employment policies were also implemented through nine Local Missions for Employment 
(Missions locales pour l’Emploi) in order to include certain populations, including Turkish and 
Moroccan ones, into the labour market. These institutions are located in communes of Brussels where 
there are significant populations of Moroccans and Turks, such as Schaerbeek, Molenbeek-Saint-Jean, 
Anderlecht and Saint-Josse-Ten-Noode. 
Integration and citizenship 
At the federal level, the acquisition of nationality has been considered a fundamental tool of 
integration since the mid-1980s when the Royal Commissariat for Immigrant Policy started to set up 
guidelines for the integration of immigrants (Gsir et al. 2005: 7). Becoming Belgian was considered as 
a political solution for becoming fully part of Belgian society. Dual citizenship has been also allowed. 
Accordingly, the nationality law changed several times, particularly in the 1990s but also in 2000, in 
order to facilitate the acquisition of Belgian nationality. Conditions such as “the desire to integrate”, 
which were difficult to objectively measure, have been dropped and the acquisition of nationality has 
mainly been based on duration of residence and the jus soli principle. These reforms obviously 
favoured the acquisition of Belgian nationality both by Moroccan and Turkish migrants (see figure 
below). The number of Moroccans and Turks progressively decreased following the changes in the 
law during the 1990s and the 2000s.  
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Figure 4. Acquisition of Belgian nationality from 1990 to 2010 
 
Sources: EMN (2012: 138-145) according to National Register/SPF Economy. 
However, a recent change in the Belgian nationality code, adopted in December 2012 and entered into 
force in January 2013, critically restricted the acquisition of nationality by extending the residence 
requirement to a minimum of 5 years and reintroducing detailed integration conditions (the knowledge 
of one of three official languages, and the definition of social integration as holding a diploma, 
completing a vocational training or having continuous work for a defined period of time).7 At this 
stage, it is still too early to evaluate the consequences of these changes. As Martiniello and Adam 
(2013) have underlined, the integration programmes are implemented in accordance with these 
language requirements and proof of integration (Martiniello and Adam 2013: 89). This new nationality 
code could thus particularly impact the implementation integration programmes in Brussels and 
Wallonia where language classes are not compulsory.  
Finally, even though integration measures and policies are developed at different levels of the state 
with more (Flanders) or less (Wallonia) interventionism by authorities (Adam 2013: 555), the latest 
developments show a trend of approaching new migrants with increasingly assimilationist views. 
Moreover, Belgian integration policies are closely linked to the evolution of Belgium as a federal 
state, to the history of national minorities (in particular for Flanders) and to the vision that federated 
entities have of their future (Flanders’ interests in becoming an independent state). 
                                                     
7
 Law of 4 December 2012 modifying the Belgian Nationality Code in order to make the acquisition of Belgian 
nationality neutral from an immigration perspective. 14 January 2013 Royal Decree implementing the Law of 
4 December 2014. 
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3.2 Emigration/diaspora policies of Turkey and Morocco  
Turkish emigration and diaspora policies 
From the very beginning of emigration to Europe, Turkey demonstrated interest in its emigrants and 
even in potential emigrants when it concluded a bilateral agreement with Belgium. As mentioned 
before, Turkish authorities negotiated specific provisions for their nationals with the Belgian 
government (Frennet-De Keyser 2004: 249). The Turkish government encouraged labour emigration 
for several reasons. Reducing unemployment was obviously an important objective and the prospect of 
remittances from Turkish migrants, another (Bayar et al. 2004: 358). Moreover, as labour migration 
was perceived as be temporary migration, the Turkish government also expected that once they 
returned to Turkey, migrant workers trained in European industries would support Turkey’s 
development and modernization (Manço and Manço 1992: 19). Accordingly, the Turkish authorities 
organized emigration to Belgium through the Turkish Employment Service (Is ve Isci Bulma Kurumu), 
which was in charge of recruiting emigrant workers and meeting Belgian demand (ibidem). Moreover, 
Belgian and Turkish authorities were in close contact during the first years of the bilateral agreement 
implementation. 
There is an interesting tool to mention here because it was created specifically to foster the 
integration of Turkish migrant workers in Belgium and there was no equivalent for other migrants 
groups in Belgium such as Moroccans. This tool was an informational newsletter intended for Turkish 
immigrant workers: the Bulletin of Turkish Workers (Bulletin des Travailleurs Turcs – Türk İşçileri 
Bülteni) which was published from 1964 to 1970 (Khoojinian 2007: 521). The first Turkish migrants, 
who arrived in the Belgian coalmines, were unhappy with their working conditions especially since 
they were neither prepared nor informed of the drudgery that awaited them. They were also 
dissatisfied with their living conditions (ibidem). As they frequently stopped working or quit their 
jobs, employers addressed their complaints to the Turkish Embassy (ibidem). The Belgian Ministry of 
Labour, in collaboration with the Belgian Coal Federation and the Turkish Embassy, decided to edit 
and freely distribute this monthly newsletter published in Turkish, but also in French and Dutch for the 
employers (ibidem). This newsletter included information not only about working rules, holidays, 
advice on food, clothes, children’s education, etc. but also about events such new Turkish family 
arrivals, births, deaths, new mosques, etc. (Khoojinian 2007: 526). It was appreciated by the workers 
(ibidem). Beginning with the first newsletter, the tone was set with a message from the Turkish 
Ambassador inviting the workers to learn the language, have good relations with their neighbours, 
solve conflicts peacefully and respect their employers (ibidem). This communication tool specifically 
aimed to encourage Turkish migrants’ integration in Belgium but from a perspective of profitability 
between both Turkey and Belgium. The Bulletin also contained information related to Turkey 
(Khoojinian 2007: 548). The Bulletin for Turkish Workers was initially intended for Turkish miners 
but very quickly it was also gradually distributed to Turkish migrants employed in other sectors 
(Khoojinian 2007: 532). It strongly promoted family reunion and worker stabilization in the Belgian 
economy while simultaneously relaying messages from the Turkish embassy promoting Turkish 
identity and encouraging remittances (Khoojinian 2007: 546). Serving the interests of both the Belgian 
and Turkish governments, the Bulletin contributed to the integration of Turkish migrant workers in 
Belgium.  
In the 1980s, realizing that the settlement of Turkish emigrants had become permanent, the Turkish 
government became keen to maintain close ties but with the aim of monitoring and improving living 
conditions for “definitive” migrants (Karci Korfali 2014: 2). First, the Dual Citizenship Law adopted 
in 1981 encouraged Turkish emigrants to naturalize in their new country of residence. Emigrants were 
required to inform the Turkish government about their acquisition of new citizenship in order to not 
lose Turkish citizenship (Keyman and Içduygu 2003). Second, the new Turkish Constitution of 1982 
provided a specific article including emigrants in government responsibilities: “The Government takes 
measures to ensure the family unity of the Turkish citizens working in foreign countries, to educate 
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their children, to meet their cultural needs and to provide social security, to protect their link to the 
motherland and to facilitate their coming back” (Art. 62). Moreover, in 1987 Turkey applied for 
access to the European Economic Community and was officially recognised as a candidate for full 
membership in 1999. It has been recognized that the Turkish diaspora in Belgium and more generally 
in the European Union could play a significant role in the European integration process (Bozarslan 
2001). 
In 1995, a measure called the Turkish Pink Card Procedure (called Blue Card since 2009) was 
created to ensure political and social rights in Turkey for Turkish migrants who had lost their Turkish 
nationality because they acquired the nationality of their new resident country. This “privileged non-
citizen status” provided Turkish migrants and their offspring with rights equivalent to those of Turks 
residing in Turkey, except for voting rights (Kadirbeyoğlu 2007: 133). Accordingly, Turkish migrants 
could acquire property, operate businesses, be eligible for inheritance and reside and work in Turkey 
(ibidem). 
Moreover, two important institutions were established in 1998 in order to engage with emigrants 
abroad. Firstly, the Advisory Committee for Turkish Citizens Living Abroad (Yurtdışında Yaşayan 
Vatandaşlar Danışma Kurulu), composed of elected Turkish emigrants and Turkish officials, aims to 
develop socio-integration policies for Turks or Turkish Blue Card holders abroad by assessing their 
needs. Secondly, the High Committee for Turkish Citizens Living Abroad (Yurtdışında Yaşayan 
Vatandaşlar Üst Kurulu) elaborates policies for Turks abroad, under the presidency of the Turkish 
Prime Minister. Finally, the creation in 2010 of the Prime Ministry Presidency for Turks Abroad and 
Relative Communities (Yurtdışı Türkler ve Akraba Toplulukları Başkanlığı) tops the government’s 
systematic approach to emigration. This new government department coordinates services for Turkish 
citizens living abroad and in particular, in the two aforementioned committees. It is organized into 
seven departments, of which Citizens Abroad (defining the government diaspora engagement strategy) 
and Public Relations and Communication (supporting NGOs established by Turks abroad) are 
especially important. Finally, beginning in 2012, this body has been publishing a quarterly newsletter 
in Turkish to remind immigrants abroad about their Ottoman past and to strengthen their sense of 
belonging. 
Turkey has also signed bilateral agreements against double taxation and social security agreements 
with several countries including Belgium to ensure emigrants’ socio-economic rights in both 
countries. Moreover, Turkey allows Turkish adults (18 years old or older) living abroad (including 
those who hold dual citizenship) to vote in general and presidential elections and for referendums in 
Turkey. They are also allowed to stand for election. Voting is possible through regular or electronic 
mail, in the consulates or at the borders, depending on the type of election in the residence country. 
Ties between Turkish emigrants abroad and Turkey are also maintained through other bodies 
targeting specific socio-cultural aspects of Turkish migrants abroad. Firstly, regarding religious 
practices, the Presidency of Religious Affairs (Diyanet), which disseminates official information about 
Islam in Turkey, has been sending imams and Islamic teachers to Europe since the 1970s. These 
teachers have supported Turkish migrants’ mobilization and the creation of Turkish organizations 
(Kanmaz 2003). They have also promoted a Kemalist and nationalist ideology to support the return of 
Turkish migrant workers (ibidem). In the 1980s, in several countries, the Turkish government initiated 
the establishment of the Turkish-Islamic Union of Religious Affairs, which has become the largest 
Turkish diaspora organizationin Europe. In Belgium, it is the Belçika Turk Islam Diyanet Vakfi, 
established in Brussels in 1982 (El Battiui, Nahavandi, and Kanmaz 2004: 19). It receives teachers 
trained and funded by the Turkish government and manages almost half the Turkish mosques in 
Belgium (Kanmaz 2003). Other Turkish mosques reveal the religious diversity of the Turkish 
population, although the majority are Sunni Muslims. One third belong to the political-religious 
movement Milli Görüş and the others to various mystic Islamic movements such as Süleymanci, 
Cemaat-i Nur/Nurcu or Nakşibendi and finally to the Alevi (El Battiui et al. 2004: 20). Secondly, in 
order to promote culture abroad, Yunus Emere Institutes were created in the 2000s in order to ensure 
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Turkish language classes for young generations of the Turkish population abroad. The Turkish 
Ministry of Education also sends Turkish teachers abroad and the Turkish Culture Programme 
provides Turkish language classes at school. Moreover, a number of Turkish private schools were 
opened abroad under the roof of the Gulen Movement. Thirdly, several migrant organizations have 
been set up in Belgium by the Turkish population. This is the case of Eyad, the House of Turkey, 
created in the mid-1990s and established in the heart of the Turkish neighbourhood in Brussels. This 
organization of Turkish shopkeepers was originally a hometown-association whose actions favoured 
the Emirdag district, from where many Turkish migrants originate. Eyad’s agenda progressively 
extended to support the participation and integration of Turkish migrants, in particular women and 
their offspring. Its activities include French classes. Over time, this Turkish organization has targeted a 
broader public including Belgian and other migrant populations.  
Finally, an important and diversified network of Turkish organizations developed in Belgium 
which kept close ties with Turkey without necessarily being initiated by the Turkish government. At 
least until the end of the 1980s (Kanmaz 2003), the organizations developed according to political and 
ideological cleavages in Turkey, such as right and left or secular and practicing Muslims. After that, 
the civic participation of Turkish migrants was influenced by second generation Turks born in 
Belgium, who took Belgian society as a model rather than focusing on the country of origin of their 
parents (ibidem). The new generation of Turks helped to open the agenda of former Turkish-migrant 
organizations. New organizations have been created such as women’s associations or multi-cultural 
associations rather than exclusively Turkish ones (ibidem). 
Moroccan emigration and diaspora policies 
When Morocco signed the 1964 bilateral agreement with Belgium, government interests were quite 
similar to those of the Turkish government. Morocco wanted to reduce unemployment, bring in 
currency through expected remittances, contribute to financing domestic investment and furthermore 
to support modernization and development with the expected return of trained Moroccan workers (De 
Haas 2007: 13; Brand 2010: 132). Another interest was political, aiming to “mitigate rebellious 
tendencies in several Berber areas” such as the Rif area (De Haas 2007:10). Morocco’s main interests 
were economic; the main issue for Morocco was not sending emigrants abroad but having a profitable 
workforce (Frennet-De Keyser 2003). The bilateral agreement between Belgium and Morocco was 
above all an economic agreement (Brand 2010: 131). As already mentioned, the agreement provided 
very few elements regarding Moroccan migrant workers’ living conditions. This demonstrated one the 
one hand that Moroccan authorities had little interest in emigrants and on the other hand, that Belgian 
government interests dominated (Frennet-De Keyser 2003 and 2004a). In order to implement the 
bilateral agreement, an Emigration Office was created in 1964 inside the Moroccan Ministry of 
Labour and Social Affairs (Brand 2010: 131). 
Nevertheless, the Moroccan authorities were not totally indifferent to Moroccan migrant workers 
abroad – far from it (Ouali 2004a: 49). As mentioned earlier, the bilateral agreement signed with 
Belgium lacked certain elements. In the 1960s, a question arose about family allowances for the 
children of Moroccan emigrant workers who were still residing in Belgium. Consequently a social 
security agreement was signed in 1968. Another agreement on technical cooperation was also 
concluded in 1965 for the purpose of development cooperation.
8
 While Moroccan authorities cared 
about yearly remittances, and encouraged the creation of bank branches abroad (in particular the 
Banque Centrale Populaire) (De Haas 2007: 16), beginning in 1973, they also set up a network of 
government-controlled migrant associations called Amicales which were in charge of controlling the 
socio-cultural and political activities of Moroccan emigrants (Ouali 2004a: 50). From the 1960s to the 
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1980s, these Moroccan associations reminded Moroccan emigrants of their duty of allegiance and 
respect to Morocco (ibidem). Already in 1962, when King Hassan II ascended the throne, he reiterated 
that all Moroccans were his subjects and were thus subject to royal authority, including Moroccans 
abroad (Brand 2010: 132). Furthermore (and this is an important difference with Turkey), according to 
the Moroccan constitution, Islam is the religion of the state and the Moroccan King claims his 
legitimacy as a descendant of the Islamic prophet Muhammad. Political allegiance thus overlaps with 
religious allegiance, whereas in the Republic of Turkey, secularism is the basis of the Turkish 
constitution. 
The first sign of Turkey’s engagement of Moroccans abroad as citizens rather than subjects 
happened in the mid-1980s. For the 1984 general elections, the electoral law provided five new seats 
for deputies who were representatives of Moroccan emigrants (Brand 2010: 133). This change of 
approach in the Moroccan diaspora policy was also reflected by a new appellation for emigrants: 
Moroccans Residing Abroad (De Haas 2007). The Moroccan government has progressively realized 
various changes regarding the Moroccan population abroad such as permanent settlement, the loss of 
identity, distance from Moroccan culture and integration in host societies (Ouali 2004a: 50). During 
the 1990s, specific Moroccan institutions were set up to develop a Moroccan diaspora policy. In 1990, 
the Hassan II Foundation for Moroccans Residing Abroad was created in order to strengthen ties with 
Moroccans abroad. This private organization, despite its mandate from the government, had six 
priority domains regarding Moroccans abroad: education, cultural exchange, sports and youth, legal 
and social assistance, economic development and cooperation and partnership (Agunias 2009: 16). 
The main activities of the Hassan II Foundation consist of facilitating summer holidays in Morocco for 
Moroccan emigrants and posting Moroccan teachers of Arabic and Moroccan culture to immigration 
countries (De Haas 2007: 24).  
The Ministry of the Moroccan Community Abroad was created in 1990 (Brand 2010: 134). 
However, it was suppressed a few years later and its competencies were transferred to the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and Cooperation (ibidem). After several institutional changes, the Ministry of 
Moroccans Residing Abroad was re-established as an independent ministry in 2007 (Desiderio 2014). 
The Bank El Amal was also created in 1989 in order to help Moroccans residing abroad to finance 
investment projects in Morocco. In 1993, a Royal Decree created a Ministerial Delegate for the Prime 
Minister Responsible for Moroccan Residents Abroad in order to provide specific resources to 
emigrants, such as banking resources, diaspora tax information, investment advice, customs and 
transportation information, etc. (Agunias 2009: 10). Finally, the discourse developed by the 
Ministerial Delegate set the tone of the new diaspora policy, which was described as threefold: a 
socio-cultural dimension aiming to improve the knowledge of Moroccans abroad through programmes 
created by the Hassan II Foundation’s Observatory for the Moroccan Community Residing Abroad;
9
 
actions to help emigrants maintain ties with the “motherland”; and finally the promotion of the image 
of Morocco among the young generation (Ouali 2004a: 50). 
In the 2000s, Moroccan policy continued to be oriented towards the protection of Moroccans 
abroad. The four-year plan for economic and social development (2000-2004) took into account 
Moroccan residents abroad and underlined the importance of identity and belonging, and ties between 
Morocco and the Moroccan diaspora abroad; the government objective was to strengthen relations in 
order to avoid migrant integration in the destination country (Brand 2010: 134). One element, which is 
quite different from the Turkish approach, concerns dual citizenship and political rights. Until the 
early 1990s, Morocco used to actively and strongly discourage its citizens abroad from acquiring 
nationality (or voting or integrating in any way) in the countries of destination (De Haas 2007: 19). 
Nevertheless, since the 1990s, it has encouraged dual citizenship and integration (while, of course, 
promoting ‘homeland’ connections). This is part of a broad shift in strategy and policy towards 
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in collaboration with the IOM (Agunias, 2009 : 16 ; Ouali, 2004a : 50). 
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emigrants, which was emphasized with the ascension of Mohammed VI in 1999. Since the last reform 
of the Moroccan code of nationality in 2005, article 6 now says: “a child born of a Moroccan father or 
a child born of a Moroccan mother is a Moroccan citizen”. This change was a consequence of the 
reform of the Moroccan Family Code (Mudawanna) (De Haas 2007). Moreover, between the ages of 
18 and 20 years old, the concerned child can submit a request to the Ministry of Justice to keep the 
nationality of the other parent. Dual citizenship is tolerated in this case. In the same year, the right to 
vote and to be elected was also granted to Moroccans abroad. This right was reaffirmed in the new 
Moroccan Constitution in 2007. Nevertheless, in the first elections in which Moroccans residing 
abroad could finally vote, the implementation of the right was quite limited because only proxy votes 
were authorized (Ait Madani 2014). 
The Agency for Skills and Employment Promotion (Agence Nationale des Promotions de l’Emploi 
et des Compétences – ANAPEC) was created in 2005 under the supervision of the Ministry of 
Employment and Vocational Training. Through its department ANAPEC International, it manages job 
offers coming from abroad and offers a platform to match Moroccan workers with international, and in 
particular European, job offers. Moreover, it includes a space for Moroccan residents abroad, 
supporting their efforts to find a job or to develop a business in Morocco.
10
  
Ties between Morocco and Moroccan migrants in Belgium are also sustained through different 
organizations and through Moroccan unions and political parties (Saïdi 1997). In the 1970s, Moroccan 
migrants created organizations in Belgium in order to help migrant workers but also in order to 
maintain links with their place of origin from a return perspective. Moroccan migrant organizations 
progressively diversified their objectives from social and labour claims to identity and cultural claims 
and finally integration demands (Ouali 2004b: 311). Some organizations were created independently 
from the Moroccan government, in particular those criticizing the Moroccan state, such as the 
Association of Moroccans from Belgium for the Defence of Human Rights (created in 1991). Non 
state-actors such as mosques and broadcasts or websites such as Wafin have also developed links with 
Moroccan migrants. The latter was a portal that was particularly active in the 2000s, which 
specifically aims to bridge Morocco and Moroccan migrants in Belgium.  
In 2003, Morocco also adopted a law on immigration, irregular emigration, and the entry and 
sojourn of foreigners. With European support, it has also developed a policy to more strictly control 
irregular emigration to Europe and to increase border controls. Finally in 2013, a migration and 
mobility partnership was signed between Morocco and the European Union. Belgium was one of the 
nine European Member States involved in this mobility partnership, which aims to provide mobility 
measures such as visa facilitation for some categories of Moroccan migrants. One objective of the 
partnership is to improve the information available to qualified Moroccan citizens on employment, 
education and training opportunities available in the EU. Another objective is to support the 
integration of Moroccan migrants who regularly visit an EU Member State. 
Integration in Belgium from Turkey and Morocco perspectives 
At the beginning of the labour migration to Belgium, both Morocco and Turkey had an instrumental 
view of emigrants who were supposed to serve their economic interests in the short term by 
disappearing from the mass of unemployed, in the midterm by sending remittances and even in the 
long term by returning with European professional experience and investing in their home country. 
Thus both Moroccan and Turkish governments shared the same objectives even though they did not 
engage in the same way with Belgian authorities to protect worker interests. Turkey was more 
proactive in this respect. Even though the bilateral agreement signed with Morocco was a relatively 
late post-immigration framework, because many Moroccan migrants had already entered Belgium on 
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individual basis as “tourists”, the Moroccan government did not demonstrate a particular interest in 
ensuring them specific rights and living conditions in Belgium. 
After the end of the massive labour migration, there were no specific institutions or measures in 
Turkey (from an emigration point of view) regarding education or language courses to support 
integration in Belgium. Even though French is among the foreign languages provided in the curricula 
in Turkey, pupils tend to prefer English. From an informal point of view, there has been evidence of 
chain migration between Turkey and Belgium since the beginning of mass migration. Potential 
emigrants can thus benefit from Belgian Turks’ experiences and advice before departing and also upon 
arrival. In Morocco, the situation is different as the French language is a heritage from French 
colonization and is still broadly present not only in schools and universities but also in the media. 
There is also chain migration between Morocco and Belgium, including opportunities for potential 
emigrants to benefit from Belgian Moroccans’ advice during the entire migration trajectory. 
After the closure of Belgium’s official borders in August 1974, both Morocco and Turkey 
gradually realized that their emigrants who went to Belgium would rather settle there than come back 
and that they needed another approach. For both cases, several authors have underlined that this shift 
in approach is illustrated by a change in the way they referred to these emigrants (Ouali 2004; De Haas 
2007; Brand 2010). Instead of “migrant workers”, they became “citizens abroad”. Both Turkey and 
Morocco understood their interests in maintaining ties with these sources of remittances, and could 
also better serve their respective political interests from where migrants resided. Nevertheless, this 
report shows that they developed measures oriented to their diaspora in quite different ways. Turkey 
has certainly been more quick to consider the importance of the diaspora and has been more proactive, 
whereas Morocco, despite the huge number of Moroccans in Belgium, was slower and perhaps less 
efficient (see the voting rights implementation, for example). Turkish diaspora policy may also be 
influenced by Turkey’s prospects for EU membership. The relations between Morocco and the EU are 
different and limited to the development of mobility partnerships.  
From the 1960s to the early 1980s, no major contradictions appear between the Belgian 
government and Turkey’s efforts to maintain links with emigrants. During this period of labour 
migration, both Turkish and Moroccan migrant workers were seen as temporary migrants who were 
expected to return to Turkey or Morocco. During the 1980s, it was realized that migrant workers had 
in fact settled and that (from the perspective of the destination country) integration policies had been 
progressively designed. As mentioned previously, except for the last reform of the nationality code, 
the Belgian federal government has always favoured integration through the acquisition of Belgian 
nationality. Turkey allowed dual citizenship quite early. Thus many Turkish migrants residing in 
Belgium hold both nationalities. The Turkish population have seemingly organized themselves 
according to the principle of ethnic solidarity. Turkish migrants have tended to live in neighbourhoods 
where there are high concentrations of co-ethnics. The Turkish population has also tended to favour 
endogamous marriages rather than inter-ethnic ones. Turkish migrants have created a dense network of 
associations, hometown associations and mosques, supported by the Turkish government and other 
institutions like the Gülen Movement or the media. Indeed, the Turkish government developed a 
diaspora policy aiming to foster ties with migrants as well as nourish and strengthen the feeling of 
belonging to the Turkish or even Ottoman identity, briefly national identity. The Moroccan 
government has also been keen to maintain close ties with Moroccan migrants and to foster their sense 
of identity and belonging to Morocco. However, since the change of king in 1999, it seems that the 
Moroccan authorities have shown more openness toward multiple allegiances and political integration 
abroad. 
In Belgium, different integration policies developed according to the region. Turkish migrants 
complied with the Flemish Minorities policy developed in Flanders and the Brussels-Capital Region 
when they self-organized. İndeed since the mid-1990s, the self-organization of minorities has been 
highly promoted and was considered a means of emancipation by the Flemish government, which is 
also anxious to organize self-mobilization (Kanmaz 2003). Most Turkish organizations in Flanders are 
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now federated under Flemish structures and funded by Flemish authorities (ibidem). This development 
helped Turkish organizations to get over political and religious cleavages coming from their country of 
origin and to instead focus on migrants’ common difficulties and interests when living in Belgium 
(ibidem). 
Finally, Turkish migrants do not constitute a homogeneous group; some may be in opposition to 
the regime or ruling authorities of Turkey and are organized accordingly. Therefore, the Turkish 
government has adopted various actions depending on the different characteristics of the diaspora, in 
particular with regard to Kurdish emigrants, whom they have tried to control and track in Belgium, 
even in collaboration with Belgian authorities (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003a). In other words, Turkey 
tried to protect the rights of Turkish emigrants abroad if they adopted the Turkish nationalist ideology 
(Østergaard-Nielsen 2003b). This may also be the case for Moroccan migrants, as some of them have 
been in opposition to the Moroccan regime and have denounced it for human rights violations.  
4. Integration trends of Turkish and Moroccan migrants in Belgium  
In this part, the integration of Turkish and Moroccan migrants is analysed according to different 
dimensions: the labour market, education, citizenship and civic and political participation and finally, 
residence and housing. Almost each section takes into account the data produced in the framework of 
the INTERACT statistics analysis and the available literature regarding the studied dimension. The 
INTERACT quantitative analysis is based mainly on the national Labour Force Survey and, in the case 
of Belgium, runs a Principal Component Analysis for seven priority EU member states and seven 
priority countries of origin (here Turkey and Morocco are also called migration corridors). Given the 
list of origin-destination integration indicators, the Principal Component Analysis methodology allows 
us to create synthetic indexes of integration which take into account the weight of each indicator to 
explain the phenomenon. By using these weights, a synthetic index can be constructed for each 
dimension: labour market, education etc. for each migration corridor. Here below, the presented 
indexes are the normalised values of integration measures, which are calculated based on the set of 
initial indicators that are explained for each studied dimension. The indexes rank the corridors based 
on the level of integration by assigning numbers from 0 to 1. The higher the rank, the better the 
integration. 
 
Table 4. Integration Index in Belgium:  
a comparison between Moroccan and Turkish immigrants 
 Moroccan immigrants Turkish immigrants 
Labour Market Integration Index 0.14 0.26 
Education Integration Index 0.17 0.03 
Citizenship Integration Index 0.93 1 
Source: Di Bartolomeo et al. 2015. 
 
4.1 Labour market integration  
The INTERACT analysis reveals that the labour market integration index differs between Moroccan 
and Turkish migrants. It takes into account the following labour market indicators to calculate the 
labour market integration index: employment and unemployment rates, and the activity and over-
qualification rates. The index is respectively 0.14 for Moroccan migrants and 0.26 for Turkish 
migrants, indicating better integration into the labour market for the latter.  
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Within the Belgian working population, according to the quantitative analysis based on the Labour 
Force Survey, 86.3% workers are employed and 13.7% are self-employed. Migrant populations also 
have a higher share of employed workers (90.8% Moroccans and 81.9% Turks). However in this case, 
there are twice as many self-employed Turkish migrants than Moroccan migrants (18.1% Turks and 
9.2 Moroccans). The figure below shows that the share of unemployment is higher among the migrant 
population in comparison with natives, but also that it is higher among Moroccan migrants than among 
Turkish migrants. 
Table 5. Employment versus unemployment  
 Employed  Unemployed Inactive Labour force Unemployment rate 
Moroccan  40.6% 15.2% 44.2% 55.8% 27.2% 
Turkish 43.5% 10% 46.5% 53.5% 18.7% 
Belgian 63.8% 4.5% 31.6% 68.4% 6.6% 
Source: Di Bartolomeo et al. 2015. 
The data produced by INTERACT also shows the distribution of Moroccan and Turkish migrants in 
the various sectors of the labour market. Both populations are dominant in the service sector, as is the 
Belgian native population. However, Moroccan migrants work more in this sector than Turkish 
migrants, with a respective share of 78% versus 67%. In manufacturing sector, it is the reverse; there 
are more Turkish migrants (33%) than Moroccan migrants (22%). Finally, 1% of Turkish migrants 
work in agriculture, but no Moroccan migrants do. However, the distribution of both Turkish and 
Moroccan migrants regarding their occupational levels, as defined by ISCO classification, is quite 
similar. Indeed, 17% of Moroccans and 16.2% of Turks occupied high-qualification occupations 
(ISCO 1, 2 and 3) versus 46.2% Belgians. In lesser-qualified occupations (ISCO 4 to 9), they are 
dominant in a very similar trend: the Belgian population occupied 53.8% of these occupations, 
whereas Turks occupied 83.8% and Moroccans, 83%. 
During the active recruitment period, both Turkish and Moroccan migrants were integrated into the 
labour market. They worked in coal mines, in particular in the bottom of the mines, and afterwards, 
they were orientated to other sectors that had been abandoned by Belgian workers. They were thus 
confined to hard, dirty and dangerous occupations (Rea 2006). After 1974, the context of high 
unemployment made it difficult for second-generation migrants to enter the labour market (Frennet-De 
Keyser 2004a: 343). Both Turkish and Moroccan migrants were in disadvantaged positions in the 
Belgian labour market. Nevertheless, “Turkish immigrants in Belgium are more likely than any other 
group to be blue-collar workers, earning less than the Belgians or other migrant groups. They are 
mainly situated in industry and the service sector, and are heavily represented in agriculture and 
horticulture, metallurgy and the waste processing industry” (Wets 2006: 95). According to Manço 
(2012), 45% are employed, with more than half in low-qualified jobs; 9% are self-employed whereas 
only 4% of Moroccans are self-employed (Manço 2012: 6). In response to unemployment pressures 
and to difficulties accessing the labour market, some immigrants have opted for self-employment 
(Wets 2006: 96). In the last decades, the number of businesses owned by Moroccan and Turkish 
migrants, such as grocery stores, bakeries, snack bars and restaurants has doubled (ibidem). Finally, 
there are also important differences between men and women regarding access to the labour market. 
Forty-four percent of Turkish migrant women are active in the labour market versus 23% of Moroccan 
migrants (Manço 2012: 6). 
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4.2 Education 
The INTERACT education integration index was calculated on the basis of several indicators (highest 
educational attainment, school enrolment rate at ages 15-25 and at ages 25-35, percentage of 
international students at ages 20-24). Regarding this last indicator, the number of students coming 
from Morocco and Turkey are quite similar; the average numbers for 2005 to 2012 are respectively 
122 and 112. The education index is higher in the case of Moroccan migrants, indicating that they 
better integrate in terms of education than Turkish migrants, who have a very low index of only 0.03 
versus 0.17 for Moroccan migrants.  
The share of tertiary-educated is quite different for Moroccan and Turkish migrants. It is two times 
higher for Moroccan migrants (10.8%) than for Turkish migrants (5.6%). The gap for Turkish 
migrants is thus even larger in comparison with the Belgian population, 28.3% of whom are tertiary-
educated. Accordingly, the data on school enrolment shows different enrolment rates among the 
populations studied. These rates are different according to the age cohort. For the Belgian population 
between 15 and 25 years old, the rate of enrolment is 66%. For Moroccan and Turkish migrants, it is 
lower. And there is an important difference between the two corridor migrations: only 31% of Turkish 
migrants are enrolled versus 53% of Moroccans. At ages 25-35, only 4% of Belgians are enrolled, 
which is the same for the Turks. Eight percent of Moroccans tend to attend school even when they are 
older. Furthermore, it appears that Moroccan and Turkish students do not follow the same field of 
studies except for technical studies (29.4% for both). The figure below shows that social sciences are 
the preferred field of study for Moroccans and Turks. This is different for the Belgian population, 
which prefers technical studies. The field of health-related studies is comprised of only 12.3% 
Moroccans and no Turks. 
Table 6. Field of studies 
 Humanities  Social sciences  Technical Health 
Moroccans  24.3% 34% 29.4% 12.3% 
Turks 22.6% 39.9% 29.4% 0% 
Belgians  29.4% 27.8% 37.5% 17.9% 
Source: Di Bartolomeo et al. 2015. 
Turkish and Moroccan migrant workers who came through the bilateral agreements in the 1960s and 
the 1970S were characterized by low levels of education (Neels and Stoop 1998). Nevertheless, there 
were “fewer men without formal education in the Turkish community than in the Moroccan 
community” (Neels and Stoop 1998: 7). This difference is due to different histories in the education 
system of the countries of origin (ibidem). In Turkey, attending elementary school has been 
compulsory since the foundation of the republic in 1923. In Morocco, a national system of education 
started only after independence in 1957 (ibidem). The Turkish and Moroccan migrant women had an 
even lower education (Phalet and Swyngedouw 2003: 10). After 1984, only 2% of Turkish and 
Moroccan male migrants who arrived in Belgium did not have an education (Neels and Stoop 1998: 
7). The children of Turkish and Moroccan migrant workers in Belgium were oriented differently in 
secondary school; the former chose technical and vocational training whereas the latter focused on 
general education leading to higher education (Neels and Stoop 1998: 6). Ouali also highlighted the 
fact that since the beginning of the 1980s, but particularly since the 1990s, the daughters of Moroccan 
migrant workers attained high levels of education (Ouali 2004: 45). However, access to university 
differs between children of Turkish and Moroccan backgrounds, with 10-11% of Turks accessing 
university and 25-30% of Moroccans (Manço 2012: 6). 
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Most Moroccan and Turkish migrants who arrived in Belgium during the last four decades were 
motivated by family reasons and came principally for the purpose of long-term residence. Less than 
10% came for work. A very small share came for studies and even fewer received protection for 
humanitarian reasons. For the latter, Turkish migrants received more permits than Moroccan migrants 
because some of them belonged to the Kurd minority and sought protection in Belgium. Table 7 
provides the average number of residence permits issued by the Belgian authorities during three years, 
according to the motive of migration. It shows that more than half of Turkish and Moroccan migration 
to Belgium is relatively permanent migration (family, asylum) rather than temporary (work, studies). 
Table 7. Average number of valid residence permits, by reason for issuing (2010-2012) 
  Turkey (permits + %) Morocco (permits + %) 
Family  21,013 57.1 46,861 60.4 
Remunerated activities  3,411 9.2 5,027 6.4 
Education  444 1.2 1,953 2.5 
Refugee status 357 0.9 12 0.01 
Subsidiary protection 9 0.02 14 0.01 
Other reasons 11,530 31.3 23,639 30.4 
Total  36,764 100   77,506 100  
Source: Eurostat, MPC Team own calculation. 
4.3 Citizenship, civic and political participation 
The INTERACT citizenship integration index is obtained according two indicators: the citizenship 
acquisition rate and the percentage of naturalised citizens out of the total born-abroad population 
(2013 data). In the case of Turkish migrants, the citizenship integration index indicates the maximum 
score (1.0). For Moroccan migrants, it is only slightly lower at 0.93. These findings confirm what was 
explained above. At the federal level, the Belgian integration policy has relied heavily on citizenship 
acquisition; several changes in the nationality codes have facilitated access to citizenship. Both 
Turkish and Moroccan migrants have benefited from the facilitated access. However, as mentioned 
already, the Turkish government has been formally encouraging Turkish migrants to naturalize as 
Belgians since 1981, when it authorized dual citizenship. This was not the case for the Moroccan 
government. In the case of the Royal Kingdom of Morocco, Moroccan migrants were discouraged 
from obtaining another nationality. In addition, King Hassan II never stopped stressing the political – 
and even religious – link between himself, the King of Morocco, and his Moroccan subjects, even 
though they were abroad. Both political and religious allegiances were requested from Moroccan 
migrants. This was not as much the case for Turkish migrants, with whom Turkey maintained cultural 
links. Even though Turkish religious organizations also took care of maintaining religious links, it is 
clear that for Turkish migrants there was not this overlapping allegiance.  
Since the signature of the bilateral agreements, Moroccan and Turkish migrant populations never 
stopped growing: eight out of ten immigrants coming from North Africa are Moroccan (Vause 2014: 
41). The Moroccan population has been always larger than the Turkish population.
11
 In the 1990s, the 
number of Moroccans migrants residing in Belgium reached its peak of 140,000 persons (Bousetta 
2010: 9). In the same period, the number of Turkish migrants peaked at approximately 90,000 and 
then decreased and stabilized around 40,000 (Manço 2012: 1). In order to understand the variation of 
numbers, it is important to take into consideration the process of naturalization. As of 1984, the new 
                                                     
11
 The following figures are based on nationality (and not on ethnic background). They give an account of the 
number of Turkish and Moroccan nationals. As soon as they are naturalized as Belgians, immigrants appear 
only as Belgian in the National Register. 
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nationality code introduced the principle of jus soli (Wets 2006: 94). Children from a Belgian mother 
and a Turkish or Moroccan father are therefore Belgian. During the 1990s (in 1992, 1995, and 1998), 
several changes in the Belgian Nationality Code aimed to facilitate access to Belgian nationality and 
simplify the procedure. They allowed second and third-generation migrants (notably Turks and 
Moroccans) to acquire Belgian nationality automatically. During this decade, 60% of the foreigners 
who acquired Belgian nationality were Moroccan or Turkish (SOPEMI 1999: 112). The number of 
naturalized Moroccans and Turks has increased since mid-1990s, with around 3,000 to 4,000 Turks 
obtaining Belgian nationality each year (Manço 2012:1). In 2000, the naturalization procedure was 
simplified again and the required duration of residence was shortened to three unbroken years instead 
of five; moreover, after seven years of residence, any foreigner with a permanent residence permit 
could obtain Belgium nationality (Wets 2006: 94). During the last decade (2001-2013), the number of 
Turkish nationals progressively decreased from 58,027 to 37,989 due to easier access to nationality 
(Vause 2014: 94). The number of Moroccan nationals also decreased during the same period from 
106,840 to 83,271; however, since 2010 it has been growing slightly (Vause 2014: 95). As mentioned 
above, if one takes into account the number of Moroccans and Turks who are naturalized, the stock of 
these populations is larger. These figures do not take into consideration the number of Turks and 
Moroccans who obtained refugee status or those who are undocumented. 
Because they can obtain Belgian nationality, Turkish and Moroccan migrants are entitled to full 
citizenship rights. They can thus participate in all Belgian elections and they must even vote, since 
voting is compulsory according to Belgian laws. In 1988, the first person of Moroccan origin was 
elected in municipal elections in Antwerp (Ouali 2004: 45). In local elections in 2000, seventy-two 
candidates of Moroccan origin, out of eighty-nine persons of non-European origin, were elected 
(ibidem). Turkish migrants seem more civically active than Moroccan migrants; for instance, 42% of 
Turkish migrants were members of an ethnic association whereas only 29% of Moroccans were 
members of an association in 2011 (Manço 2012:6). Moroccans tend to participate in multi-cultural 
associations as opposed to ethnic or hometown associations like the Turks (ibidem). The civic and 
political participation of Turkish migrants is oriented towards homeland politics, whereas Moroccan 
migrants seem more interested in local politics (Manço 2012: 6). Accordingly, political parties from 
the origin country play less of a role for Moroccan migrants than for Turkish migrants (Bousetta and 
Martiniello 2003). 
4.4 Residence and housing in the Belgian regions  
Both Moroccan and Turkish migrants in Belgium came from specific geographic regions of Morocco 
and Turkey at the time of their early arrivals. Despite this, their origin regions have diversified; there 
are still significant flows coming from certain regions due to the phenomenon of chain migration. 
Moroccans have come mainly from the Rif region, in particular from the Nador Province and the Al 
Hoceïma Province (Ouali 2004a). They have also come from the Souss region. More than half of 
Turkish migrants originated in the Central Anatolian provinces and, in particular in Afyon (which 
included a large group from Emirdag), Eskisehir and Kayseri (Wets 2006: 93). Both populations 
originated in rural areas or the countryside in Morocco and Turkey but settled mainly in urban areas in 
Belgium. After living in the accommodations near the coalmines (in the phalansteries taken over by 
employers), many of them ended up in deprived zones of the city centres (Frennet-De Keyser 2004a: 
344). 
Moroccan and Turkish migrant workers immigrated first to Wallonia. At the beginning of the 
1960s, around 60% of the foreigners lived in Wallonia. They moved to other regions and to cities such 
as Brussels, Antwerp and Gent in Flanders. They were also well implanted in the Flemish province of 
Limburg, but the Moroccans left after its economic decline whereas the Turks stayed in Limburg 
(Frennet-De Keyser 2004a: 342). In the 1990s, the distribution was more balanced between the three 
regions with 35% in Wallonia, 31% in the region of Brussels and 31% in Flanders for the year of 1998 
(Lepage 2001: 11). However, it is important to note that regarding the population of each region, the 
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weight of foreign population can be different. In 1995, the foreign population represented 29% of the 
total population in Brussels, 11.4% in Wallonia and 4.8% in Flanders, which is the more populated 
Belgian region of the three (ibidem). 
Furthermore, both the Moroccan and Turkish populations are not spread over the entire Belgian 
territory even after fifty years of immigration history. Indeed, more than half of them live in no more 
than ten communes of the 589 of Belgium. They have stayed in the industrial belt where were the 
coalfields were located. They are also very present in the region of Brussels. Sixty percent of the 
Moroccans live in the Brussels-Capital Region. Forty-five percent of them are located in the City of 
Brussels, Molenbeek-Saint-Jean, Schaerbeek, Anderlecht, Saint-Josse-ten-Noode, Saint-Gilles and 
Forest (Bousetta 2010: 10). In Flanders, they live in the cities of Antwerp and Mechelen and in 
Wallonia, they are located in Liège and its suburbs (ibidem). More than half of Turkish migrants 
settled in Flanders in Genk, Gent and Antwerp (Manço 2012: 2-3). A quarter of them live in the 
Brussels-Capital Region and in particular in the City of Brussels and in the municipalities of Saint-
Josse-ten-Noode and Schaerbeek. Finally, another quarter lives in Wallonia, particularly in Liège and 
Charleroi (Manço 2012: 2-3). Turkish migrants tend also to choose their residence in neighbourhoods 
where there are already concentrations of Turks (Manço 2012: 6).  
Finally, access to ownership developed differently for Turks and Moroccans. It appears that 52% of 
Turkish households are owners of their housing in Belgium and 61% also have a house in Turkey, 
whereas only 30% of Moroccans own their house in Belgium but like Turks, they tend to have a house 
in Morocco (60%) (Manço 2012: 6; Saaf, Sidi Hida, and Aghbal 2009: 21). This difference in 
ownership can be explained first because, as mentioned above, the bilateral agreement with Turkey 
had a provision to facilitate access to social housing. Consequently, many Turks living in social 
housing could finally buy their home. Secondly, attitudes of Turkish migrants regarding mortgage 
loans were different from Moroccan migrants, who did not want to infringe upon the Islamic principle 
of prohibiting usury or interest (Kesteloot 2006). In other words, given the high housing prices, in 
particular in the Brussels-Capital Region, Moroccans rented rather then bought their housing. 
Before ending this section, it is important to reiterate that neither Moroccan nor Turkish migrants in 
Belgium constitute homogeneous groups, even though during mass labour migration, they tended to be 
low-educated young male migrants coming from rural areas. Both groups have progressively 
diversified in terms of gender, age, qualifications, ethnicity and also regions of origin. Turkish 
migrants are, however, more diversified in terms of ethnicity, religion and culture. They include 
Kurds, Muslims and Christians, but also Sunnis, Shiites, Alevis and Yezidis (Wets 2006: 93; 
Godfirnon 2012). The Kurds from Turkey numbered around 35,000 in Belgium (Godfirnon 2012: 46) 
and the Alevis, around 16,000 (El Battiui et al. 2004: 20). Both Moroccan and Turkish migrants 
generally have a Muslim background but practice differently. In Belgium, Moroccan and Turkish 
mosques have been developed. Moroccan and Turkish migrants also compete within the legal body 
representing Muslims in Belgium (Exécutif des musulmans de Belgique).  
Furthermore, during the guest workers period, more of the Turkish migrant workers who came to 
Belgium were already married, compared to Moroccan migrant workers who tended to be single. Both 
populations have a preference for endogamous marriages. Ninety-three percent of Turks living in 
Belgium are married to other Turks, who are generally new Turkish migrants (Manço 2012: 6). 
Moreover, one out of four got married to a family member (cousin); this is higher than for the 
Moroccans (ibidem). Eighty-six percent of Moroccans living in Belgium got married to other 
Moroccans, only a quarter of whom are new migrants (ibidem). Only 8.5% of Moroccans have married 
native Belgians (Saaf et al. 2009: 21). Turkish migrants also seem to have a stronger sense of 
belonging to Turkey; 78% of them identify themselves first as Turks (Manço 2012: 6). In contrast, a 
large portion of Moroccan migrants tend to identify with a religious identity; 60% identify themselves 
first as Muslim (ibidem). 
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5. Explanatory factors of integration trends 
This part of the report is based on the qualitative survey run by the INTERACT team in Belgium. The 
qualitative survey targeted civil-society-organization volunteers or employees dealing with migrants in 
Belgium. It consisted of phone interviews with resource persons in organizations working with 
migrants. These interviews were based on pre-established questionnaires and were carried with 
twenty-seven organizations working mostly with Turkish migrants and with twenty-four organizations 
mostly working with Moroccan migrants. Most of them were non-profit associations (twenty-one 
among Turkish-oriented respondents and eighteen among Moroccan-oriented ones). Only two 
governmental organizations working mainly with Turkish migrants participated in the survey and three 
working with Moroccans.
12
 In order to give to each respondent the opportunity to develop the 
integration dimension for which s/he had specific expertise, the respondent was asked during the 
interview to choose to develop from one to three specific dimensions of those mentioned above. 
The following graphs show which dimensions were mostly developed by the Turkish-oriented and 
Moroccan-oriented associations that completed the questionnaire. 




                                                     
12
 The other participants were: one international organization and one religious institution as far as the Turkish-
oriented associations are concerned; two Trade Unions and one religious institution among the associations 
mainly working with Moroccan migrants. 
13
 This means, for example, that fifteen associations have indicated the domain of education as the domain (or 
one of the domains) within which they realise their activities.  
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Figure 6. Moroccan-oriented associations 
 
In spite of several differences in the distribution of Turkish and Moroccan associations’ activities 
within this range of dimensions, it appears that the labour market constitutes a crucial issue that both 
groups deal with. This could lead one to assume that in Belgium, there is a shared perception of the 
need for interventions carried out at the civil society level. In fact, these two groups of populations are 
overrepresented in the statistics concerning unemployment in Belgium. In addition, as labour market 
integration is the first subject addressed by Moroccan-related associations, this can indicate that 
Moroccan migrants are more concerned about unemployment than Turkish migrants are (see 
integration indexes above).
14
 The other two dimensions in which most associations intervene are 
education (Turkish-oriented organizations) and political and civic participation (Moroccan-oriented 
associations). This data highlights the fact that two other priority issues are associated with each of the 
two groups, and these are issues that pertain to different dimensions of the integration process. 
Actually, education matters (including the issuance of credential recognition by Belgian institutions) 
are directly linked to the insertion of migrants into the labour market. Indeed, economic participation 
is a crucial concern for associations. Political and civic participation, however, is not considered a 
basic need even though it is perceived as integral to the definition of migrants’ active status within the 
political and civic dynamics occurring in the countries of immigration and emigration. 
Regarding other dimensions, both Turkish and Moroccan-oriented organizations intervene less in 
religious and residential integration issues than in the above-mentioned issues. The reason for this 
could lie in the fact that these two dimensions are supported by other kinds of social structures. 
Religious institutions such as mosques or churches are active in religious issues whereas migrants 
address residential concerns to national or federal institutions.  
A transversal consideration of the different sections of the survey helps to identify three main 
directions to undertake in the analysis of the collected data: firstly, the implementation and impact of 
the policies of Morocco and Turkey on integration in Belgium; secondly, the impact of civic society 
organizations’ actions dealing with migrants from Morocco and Turkey in Belgium; and finally, the 
impact of other factors. 
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 The employment-search services are relevant but they do not constitute the first task of associations, which are 
mainly focused on providing information and strengthening occupation – skills matching. 
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5.1 Implementation and impact of the policies of Morocco and Turkey on integration in Belgium 
As seen above, both Turkey and Morocco have developed policies in order to maintain economic, 
cultural and political links with their diaspora abroad. Two questions can be addressed here: to what 
extent do Moroccan and Turkish policies impact integration in Belgium, according to associations? 
And to what extent do Moroccan and Turkish organisations in the country of origin participate in the 
activities of Moroccan and Turkish-oriented associations in Belgium? 
The survey results show that associations are quite doubtful about the impact of countries of origin 
on integration in Belgium. Regarding the question of labour market integration, which is one of the 
dimensions most developed by associations, both Turkish and Moroccan-oriented associations believe 
that associations in the country of origin do not have a serious impact on migrants’ employment in 
Belgium. The results are more balanced regarding governmental policies and the initiatives of Turkish 
or Moroccan authorities. Turkish-oriented associations seem to give relatively more importance to 
these governmental policies than Moroccan-oriented associations do. However, interestingly enough, 
both Turkish and Moroccan-oriented respondents strongly consider official pre-departure programs to 
be relevant to integration in the Belgian labour market. This result is quite intriguing because Belgium 
did not implement pre-departure programs abroad, unlike other European countries such as the 
Netherlands. Thus, it is difficult to assess whether respondents were referring to Turkish and 
Moroccan pre-departure programs or whether they recommend the implementation of such programs.  
Regarding social interactions (among migrants but also between migrants and non-migrant 
populations), it is interesting to underline that for a significant part of the respondents (nearly half of 
them), the impact of countries of origin is not visible. Some of them felt that Turkish and Moroccan 
policies regarding social interactions did not exist, and other answered that they did not have 
information about such policies. For the respondents who identified an effect of country-of-origin 
policies on the social relations of immigrants in Belgium, this effect was variably assessed. They 
sometimes insisted that these policies had a positive impact, but a significant portion of them felt that 
the policies had both positive and negative impacts on migrants’ social interactions. Turkish-oriented 
associations saw the country-of-origin influence slightly more positively than Moroccan-oriented 
associations did.  
Few respondents addressed the question of migrants’ residential integration in Belgium. However, 
for those who did, it seems that country-of-origin organizations have had an impact on the local 
environment of migrants; the respondents perceived support from Turkish and Moroccan 
organizations (governmental or not) in local associations such as schools, official representations, 
religious institutions or cultural centres in certain areas where significant migrants populations are 
settled. This result seems very coherent with the diaspora policies of Turkey and Morocco, which 
target specific socio-cultural aspects of migrant life. Both countries developed policies in order to keep 
contact with their diaspora abroad. Some of those policies (in particular in the field of culture and 
religion) were focused on the countries of destination. For example, half of the Turkish mosques in 
Belgium are managed by the Dyanet. Other political-religious movements linked with Turkey are also 
represented (such as Milli Görüş, for example). Turkey also sent Turkish teachers abroad to run 
Turkish language schools.  
While the impact of the countries of origin regarding integration in Belgium was variously 
assessed, respondents clearly felt that the political and civic participation of immigrants in their 
country of origin has had a positive impact on integration in the destination country. Both Turkish and 
Moroccan-oriented associations saw positive impacts on political and civic participation in Belgium as 
well as on the social relations of immigrants. A positive impact was noted for religious practices and 
school performance. Turkish-oriented associations also felt that there had been positive effects on 
labour market integration, access to nationality and residential integration. Regarding those three 
aspects of integration, Moroccan-related associations were more balanced in their responses. 
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The survey also offers an overview of the way in which Turkish and Moroccan organizations are 
considered active partners by associations in Belgium. This aspect is explored with respect to civic and 
political participation. As regards the partnerships built by Turkish and Moroccan-oriented 
associations in Belgium, the interesting result is that partnerships with organizations of the country of 
destination are much more promoted than partnerships with countries of origin, regardless of the kind 
of organization (governmental institution, political parties, NGOs, etc.) involved. However, this result 
has to be considered carefully, as some authors found significant differences in the civic and political 
participation of Turkish and Moroccan migrants in Belgium. Turkish migrants are more oriented 
toward homeland politics whereas Moroccan migrants seem more interested in local politics. 
Furthermore, political parties from the countries of origin play less of a role for the latter than for the 
former (see above, Manço 2012; Bousetta and Martiniello 2003). 
5.2 Impact of civic society organizations’ actions dealing with migrants from Morocco and 
Turkey in Belgium 
The first input which gives us insight about the impact of the actions of civic society organizations 
dealing with Moroccan and Turkish migrants in Belgium consists of the number of people who 
contacted the associations during 2013. This data also allows us to identify the average dimension of 
the organizations reached by the survey. In most cases, both groups of associations have been 
contacted by more than 601 migrants during the last year: fifteen Turkish-oriented associations out of 
twenty-seven and fourteen Moroccan-oriented ones out of twenty-four, thus proving that they are large 
associations. This information, together with the fact that eleven other Turkish-oriented associations 
and ten other Moroccan-oriented associations have been classified as medium-large or medium size 
organizations by reason of the number of migrants who contacted them,
15
 confirms that associations 
are conceived as important intermediators in certain dimensions of Turkish and Moroccan migrants’ 
integration process in Belgium. 
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 This means that they have been contacted by between 151 and 600 migrants (medium-large size) or between 
31 and 150 (medium size). Only one Turkish-oriented association which was identified as small (it is 
contacted by a maximum number of thirty migrants each year) has participated to the survey. 
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Figure 7. Size estimation of Turkish and Moroccan-oriented associations contacted 
 
As seen above, civic organizations were particularly focused on the labour market. In particular, both 
groups of associations found that they had the greatest impact on the employment status of immigrants 
by working on the occupational-skills matching issue: six
16
 Turkish-oriented and eight Moroccan-
oriented associations dealt with this matter. Three associations for Turkish migrants and four for 
Moroccan migrants offered interventions to help migrants with their search for employment. Only one 
from both groups helped migrants to improve wages. These responses correspond to the fact that the 
main activity of both Turkish-oriented and Moroccan-oriented associations (nine out of twelve in the 
first group, eleven out of seventeen in the second group) is lobbying for credential recognition. This 
activity responds to migrants’ skills being found insufficient for certain jobs. The non-correspondence 
between the levels of education attained in the country of origin and the typology of jobs in the 
country of destination is often a problematic issue in Belgium. The reason for this situation lies in the 
long and expensive administrative procedures of diploma recognition. Another important action 
implemented by associations (seven Turkish-oriented and ten Moroccan-oriented ones) to overcome 
this difficulty consisted of providing information about legal frameworks and the institutional setting 
in Belgium. It can be assumed that migrants, while trying to improve their labour market integration, 
can benefit from acquiring information about which legal instruments could facilitate or oppose their 
actions and which institutions they can rely on for their integration. Services offered by organisations 
(see graph below) include help obtaining information about available jobs and was implemented by 
five Turkish-oriented and eight Moroccan-oriented organizations. 
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 All the data included in this paragraph (b) comes from certain subsections of the survey where multiple 
answers were possible. This explains the fact that in some cases, the sum of the numbers of associations that 
implemented certain actions exceeds the total number of associations that filled out the sections discussed.  
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Figure 8. Services provided by contacted associations  
 
Keeping in mind the results obtained related to the labour market dimension, there is another 
interesting correspondence with regard to education dimension activities, which are the main work of 
the associations working with Turkish migrants. In fact, ten out of fifteen Turkish-oriented 
associations working in the education domain provided homework assistance and eight of them 
offered services informing immigrants about study opportunities abroad. It seems that both actions 
aimed at providing migrants with a Belgian or at least a European degree in order to avoid constraints 
in labour market integration that could be caused by a diploma obtained in the country of origin. 
Furthermore, another action consisted of lobbying institutions in the destination country to sustain the 
recognition of diplomas delivered in the countries of origin. But this lobbying is implemented in a 
lesser extent (by four Turkish-oriented organizations). 
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Only a few of the Moroccan-oriented associations intervened in education, as seen above. These 
few associations mostly informed immigrants about study opportunities abroad (four associations out 
of six). Other activities implemented in this area consisted of organizing summer schools for children 
of immigrants and providing homework assistance (three associations in each case). Such activities 
contribute to enhancing (and perhaps differentiating) the existing education assistance provided by 
civic society. 
Another dimension explored by the survey and strictly linked to education is that of language. In 
this case, Moroccan-oriented associations also intervened in this area less than Turkish-oriented ones. 
In spite of the fact that Moroccan migrants often acquired French language skills before migrating, 
teaching immigrants the official language of the destination country constituted the most implemented 
action (by four associations out of eight). This intervention is also relevant for Turkish-oriented 
associations: seven out of twelve dealt with this task. Teaching migrants the language of the country of 
origin was ranked equally among the tasks of organizations that work primarily with Turkish migrants 
(a total number of three). Other services offered by both groups of associations included translation 
(one Moroccan-oriented and four Turkish-oriented associations). The organizations also intervened by 
lobbying institutions in the destination country to teach the language of the country of origin, and 
institutions in the origin country to teach the language of destination country (a total of three Turkish-
oriented and two Moroccan-oriented associations). This data proves that associations felt that it was 
important to implement a set of actions to ensure a double linguistic competence for migrants, thus 
recognizing the relevance of this skill.
17
 
Actions are implemented to intervene with respect to the social interactions among immigrants 
(whether they both come from the same country of origin or come from different ones) and between 
immigrants and non-migrant groups. Both groups of associations mainly organized cultural, sport or 
entertainment activities and cultural visits in Belgium (respectively eight and six Turkish-oriented 
associations out of ten; and five and five Moroccan-oriented associations out of nine). For Turkish-
oriented associations, the organization of visits and exchanges of European citizens to their country of 
origin was also relevant (for five of them), while for the Moroccan-oriented ones, providing mentoring 
programs was relevant (three associations). A consistent number of Turkish-oriented associations (six) 
stated that they also offered some additional services in the domain of social interaction, other than 
those mentioned in the survey. 
A last dimension regarding the impact of the actions of civic society organizations on migrants’ 
integration is civic and political participation. A higher number of Moroccan-oriented associations 
intervene in this domain compared to Turkish-oriented associations. However, for both groups, the 
most relevant actions consist of providing information on immigrants’ civic and political rights and 
duties in the country of destination (five out of eight Turkish-oriented associations and nine out of 
eleven Moroccan-oriented ones). For Moroccan-oriented organizations (seven of them), an important 
action also consisted of advocating with politicians in the country of destination, a task which was also 
undertaken by Turkish-oriented associations but to a lesser extent (by three of them). Moroccan-
oriented associations also participated in a greater number in demonstrations, protest marches, 
boycotts and strikes in the country of destination (five of them, compared to two Turkish-oriented 
organizations). A wide range of other actions were implemented, such as giving economic support to 
migrant organizations, participating in the organisation of external voting by migrants (especially by 
Turkish-oriented associations) or supporting electoral campaigns for immigrants in the country of 
                                                     
17
 This corresponds to something which is more deeply analysed in the following paragraph, which is the 
implementation by different actors of certain actions that are aimed at giving migrants the opportunity to 
continue using their language of origin (or giving their children the opportunity to learn it). For example, 
through bilateral agreements with countries of origin, the French community of Belgium implemented a 
program called Openness to Languages and Cultures (OLC). Schools which choose to participate can 
propose language courses given by teachers from partner countries outside the school schedule. Both Turkey 
and Morocco are partners of this program. 
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destination (especially by Moroccan-oriented associations), but the precise number of organisations 
implementing these other actions is not known. This data highlights the fact that both groups of 
associations perceived a need concerning the civic and political participation of immigrants, mainly 
with regard to their rights and duties in the country of destination.  
The next section analyses some other factors considered relevant in migrants’ integration process 
by underlining how individuals themselves put in place a set of strategies – which may or may not rely 
on association activities – in order to find a better place in the social context in which they live.  
5.3 Impact of other factors 
During the survey, respondents were also asked to share their perception of migrant practices and 
strategies regarding several dimensions of integration. Two main dimensions appeared to be relevant 
domains within which migrants try to acquire a proper status both in the country of destination and the 
country of origin. These dimensions are nationality and language.  
As seen above, Moroccan and Turkish migrants in Belgium have a high citizenship-integration 
index as both populations have benefited from the facilitated access to citizenship, which was 
encouraged by the Belgium federal government (even if the two countries of origin developed 
different attitudes regarding naturalization abroad). The Turkish government formally encouraged 
migrants to naturalize after its recognition of dual citizenship. At the same time, policies were 
implemented to keep cultural links with the diaspora. In contrast, the Moroccan state tried to 
discourage Moroccan migrants from obtaining another nationality abroad.  
Since Turkey and Morocco allow dual citizenship (under different conditions), respondents felt that 
migrants tended to keep the passport of their country of origin when they naturalized. Turkish and 
Moroccan-oriented associations seemed to feel that keeping the passport from the country of origin 
was much more of an asset than having a passport from the country of destination. This was 
particularly the case for Moroccan migrants. In fact, Turkey also developed an alternative status (the 
blue card) for Turkish migrants who lost their nationality of origin, in order to maintain specific rights 
for them in Turkey. In this context, abandoning the nationality of origin can be seen as less 
problematic for Turkish migrants. According to the respondents, keeping the passport is also strongly 
linked to a sentimental attachment that migrants have with their country of origin. In comparison, 
maintaining political rights in the country of origin was perceived as less relevant.  
Another reason mentioned in the survey, and which probably explains the choice of migrants to 
keep the passport from their country of origin, is the opportunity to benefit from property rights in the 
homeland. The opinions of the two groups of associations about this aspect diverged. Most Turkish-
oriented ones found it important, while Moroccan-oriented associations did not take a significant 
shared position. It can be assumed that Turkish migrants perceive that their access to property rights in 
Turkey could be compromised by the loss of their nationality of origin, while this is not the case for 
Moroccans.  
The issue of transmitting the nationality of origin to migrants’ children born in Belgium was taken 
into consideration in the survey. The majority of both groups of associations recognized the 
importance of this question. This factor could be linked to sentimental reasons that, as seen above, 
appear to stem from a desire to maintain a double belonging and also to benefit from an additional 
value in the country of origin. This desire was perceived to be felt by migrants both for themselves and 
their children. 
Regarding the cultural dimension of integration (and in particular the learning of the language of 
origin), kinship, religious organizations and media were considered to be the principal vehicles well 
before schools were. Oral communication with relatives – taking place both in the country of 
destination and when travelling to the country of origin – and particularly television, even if not 
explicitly mentioned in the survey, were described by associations as crucial ways of transmitting 
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language skills. Schools also seem to play a role but to a lesser extent and outside the national 
curricula. However, teaching the native language is not a competence exclusive to private schools or 
schools established by other countries. Belgian public schools also provide such courses as 
extracurricular studies. According to respondents, the language skills of migrants can be an asset in 
several activity sectors, such as cultural production, import/export, diplomatic missions and religious 
organizations. In contrast, those language skills seem to be less valued in sectors such as teaching or 
multi-national companies, where apparently the knowledge of French, followed by English, is 
considered more useful. 
A third dimension which could be analysed as a possible domain within which migrants deploy a 
set of integration strategies is residential integration. Nevertheless, only two Turkish-oriented 
associations and one Moroccan-oriented association partially worked in this dimension and were able 
to give some information about the actions of migrants in this domain. What is particularly apparent 
from data concerning Turkish-oriented associations is that Belgian banks are the only source of 
funding that migrants use to secure housing in Belgium.  
6. Main conclusions 
Two bilateral agreements for temporary labour migration initiated significant flows of Moroccan and 
Turkish migrants to Belgium. However, they were negotiated differently. In both agreements, the 
interests and objectives of the country of destination were the same. This was not the case for the 
countries of origin, however. Obviously Morocco and Turkey encouraged emigration and expected 
remittances and the return of their emigrants along with new professional skills. But the government of 
Turkey demonstrated a greater interest in the protection of Turkish migrant workers’ interests. Specific 
provisions were thus included in the bilateral agreement between Belgium and Turkey, such as the 
possible family reunification of dependent parents and access to social housing. A first key finding is 
that bilateral agreements, and more broadly emigration/immigration policies, constitute a basis 
for differentiated integration between migration corridors.  
Furthermore, a second key finding is that the countries of origin may have an impact on 
integration from the beginning, when emigration starts. The Turkish and Moroccan association 
survey shows that respondents consider official pre-departure programs to be relevant to integration in 
the Belgian labour market. Furthermore, a mobility partnership has been signed recently involving 
Belgium and Morocco. It aims in particular to improve the information available to qualified 
Moroccan citizens on employment, education and training opportunities available in the EU. Another 
objective is to support the integration of Moroccan migrants who regularly visit an EU Member State. 
It is too early to assess the implementation of this mobility partnership for Belgium. But it can be 
considered an immigration agreement between both origin and destination countries that takes 
integration dimensions into account from an early stage. This impact, however, has to be articulated 
with the immigration policy of the destination country which can grant specific rights.  
The report shows that migration patterns seem similar for both Moroccan and Turkish migrants. 
They started with temporary labour migration that ended in permanent settlement, followed by family 
and marriage migration through a similar mechanism of chain migration. Nevertheless, it also shows 
different patterns of integration. The integration index was particularly obvious regarding two closely 
related dimensions: labour market and education. 
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Table 8. INTERACT integration index for Belgium: Moroccan vs. Turkish immigrants 
 Moroccan immigrants Turkish immigrants 
Labour Market Integration Index 0.14 0.26 
Education Integration Index 0.17 0.03 
 Source: Di Bartolomeo et al. 2015. 
First of all, neither of the two groups has been well integrated into the labour market or in education. 
One could expect that accurate integration in education would go hand in hand with efficient 
integration into the labour market, but the results are far from that. Even though Moroccan migrants 
seem better integrated in education, they are less integrated into the labour market. Turkish migrants, 
however, who seem very weakly integrated in education, are almost twice as integrated into the labour 
market. The explanations are structural. Indeed, the Belgian labour market is highly segmented and 
Turkish migrants are employed in sectors where a low level of education is required (Wets 2006). 
Furthermore, in order to combat unemployment, Turkish immigrants have opted for self-employment 
by opening ethnic businesses, among other things. The share of tertiary-educated is two times higher 
for Moroccan migrants (10.8%) than for Turks (5.6%), and the segmented labour market may also 
highlight the fact that educated Moroccans have difficulty accessing positions that match their 
qualifications. 
What can the impact of the countries of origin be, given these specific results? Since the end of 
active labour recruitment in 1974, few new migrants have come from Morocco and Turkey to work. 
Or more precisely, most Moroccan and Turkish migrants who legally entered Belgium during the four 
last decades were admitted for family reasons. Less than 10% came for work, a very small share came 
for studies and even fewer obtained protection for humanitarian reasons. In other words, this dominant 
migration channel does not really allow the countries of origin to try to have an impact on integration 
in the labour market, as in the case of bilateral agreements for labour migration. But the qualitative 
survey showed that labour market integration is a critical issue, and that organizations oriented 
towards both Turkish and Moroccan migrants are active in this particular field of integration. Another 
key finding is thus that countries of origin may have no impact on certain integration 
dimensions such as education and the labour market in the destination country. In this case, 
integration relies instead on other key elements, namely the opportunity structures available in the 
destination country and migrants’ capacity for mobilization. 
The citizenship integration indexes demonstrate a high rate of acquisition of Belgian nationality for 
both Moroccan and Turkish migrants with respective scores of 0.93 and 1. One can infer that in this 
particular dimension, integration succeeded because (until recently) the federal Belgian government 
considered the acquisition of Belgian nationality to be a major tool of integration. Belgian integration 
policy was developed accordingly, facilitating access to Belgian nationality for foreign residents. 
Nevertheless, the recent change in the Belgian nationality code reveals a shift in approach; nationality 
acquisition is now used to recompense integration. Here the slight differences between the two groups 
could be attributed to the different attitudes of the countries of origin regarding dual citizenship. 
Indeed, Turkey allowed and promoted the acquisition of citizenship from the new country of residence 
earlier than Morocco. Moroccan authorities have been more reluctant and were slow to accept dual 
citizenship. Until the early 1990s, they used to actively and strongly discourage their citizens abroad 
from acquiring nationality (or voting or integrating in any way) in the countries of destination (De 
Haas 2007: 19). Thus it seems that for some specific dimensions of integration, the countries of 
origin may have a positive or negative impact. In this case, the dimension is citizenship. This is not 
a surprise, as with the acquisition of new citizenship there lies a risk of loosened links with emigrants. 
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The country of origin may then demonstrate opposition to dual citizenship and dual allegiance (as 
Morocco did for a while). Or on the contrary, the country of origin may bet on the permanence of links 
with emigrants despite an additional citizenship (Turkey).  
To conclude, both Moroccan and Turkish governments have been inclined to protect their 
economic and political interests through a growing engagement with Turkish and Moroccan migrants 
in Belgium. At the beginning of the mass migration to Belgium, they mainly supported the economic 
dimension of integration in the Belgian labour market. They expected remittances from temporary 
migrant workers and they also hoped that their migrants would acquire new skills that the Moroccan 
and Turkish economies could benefit from. After the end of migration recruitment in the mid-1970s, 
other dimensions of integration were progressively taken into account. Turkey, earlier than Morocco, 
encouraged the legal and political integration of Turkish migrants in Belgium through a dual 
citizenship law in the early 1980s. It is only in the late 1990s that the Moroccan government began to 
encourage migrants’ political integration. Morocco and Turkey have thus developed legal frameworks 
and measures that are oriented toward their diasporas in a quite different ways. Turkey has certainly 
been quicker to consider the importance of the diaspora and has been more proactive, whereas 
Morocco, despite the huge number of Moroccans in Belgium, has been slower and perhaps less 
efficient in this respect.  
The table below shows the legal and political systems that frame Turkish and Moroccan diasporas 
abroad, and in this case in Belgium. 
Table 9. State-level framework of emigration/diaspora policies: Turkey vs. Morocco 
 Turkey Morocco 
Legal framework for 
emigrants/diaspora 
Formal and organized structure 
2003 Law on the entry and sojourn of 




Controlling, protecting and 
engaging diaspora 
Controlling, protecting and engaging 
diaspora 
Main state-actors 
- Prime Ministry Presidency for 
Turks Abroad and Relative 
Communities 
- Advisory Committee for 
Turkish Citizens Living Abroad  
- High Committee for Turkish 
Citizens Living Abroad  
- Ministry of Moroccans Residing 
Abroad 
- Council of Moroccan Community 
Abroad (advisory institution) 
- Hassan II Foundation 
- Observatory for the Moroccan 
Community Residing Abroad 
Socio-economic rights 
Blue Card  
1964 Bilateral agreement in force 
with Belgium 
 1964 Bilateral agreement in force with 
Belgium 
Political rights 
Right to vote in Presidential 
election, general election and for 
referendums 
  
Language and cultural 
and religious rights 
- Turkish-Islamic Union of 
Religious Affairs, Belçika Turk 
Islam Diyanet Vakfi, 
Cultural programmes and 
language courses. Turkish 
teachers and imams sent abroad. 
Moroccan teachers and imams sent 
abroad 
Dual citizenship  
Actively supported as a tool for 
integration abroad 
Formally forbidden, but increasingly 
tolerated informally 
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Countries of origin can have a significant role in encouraging and accelerating integration in the 
country of destination or, on the contrary, they can have a significant role in delaying the integration 
process. The main objectives of both Moroccan and Turkish diaspora policies seem to be to maintain 
and develop links with their respective diaspora. They want to benefit from Moroccan or Turkish 
migrants residing in Belgium. The survey results show that associations were quite doubtful about the 
impact of countries of origin on integration in Belgium. And the INTERACT research also showed 
that it was quite difficult to measure or even evaluate the impact that countries of origin may have on 
integration. It would be consistent to recognize that the initial objectives of Turkish and Moroccan 
diaspora policies are not directly focused on integration in Belgium. Migrant integration can instead be 
considered an “unstated objective” of diaspora policies (Délano 2010). Nevertheless, engagement to 
maintain and develop links and to protect Turkish and Moroccan migrants’ rights abroad can be 
considered a way of empowering migrants. The countries of origin can thus facilitate integration, but 
only indirectly.  
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